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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the concept of trust and its 
relevance to deception operations. It proposes that trust is 
a belief or characteristic that can be exploited or 
undermined to achieve a desired objective.  By using a trust 
framework to analyze several case studies in deception, the 
paper will examine how the deception target beliefs and 
preconceptions affected the success of the deception and the 
impact or consequences of exploiting or undermining trust. 
Finally, the study will attempt to draw conclusions from 
this analysis that may be helpful in the analysis of other 
deception operations and in future deception planning. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
This study explores the concept of trust and its 
relevance to deception operations. It proposes that trust is 
a belief or characteristic that can be exploited or 
undermined to achieve a desired objective.  By using a trust 
framework to analyze several case studies in deception, 
conclusions will be drawn regarding how the deception target 
beliefs and preconceptions affected the success of the 
deception and the impact or any consequences of exploiting 
or undermining trust. 
B. RELEVANCE 
Throughout history and in recent conflicts, deception 
has been used successfully to achieve objectives at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. There has 
been debate about deception—some theorists question its 
decisiveness, relevancy and value to a strong military, 
while others argue about the ethics of its use. Since a 
weaker adversary has the potential to prevail over a 
stronger opponent by using deceptive techniques, it makes 
such techniques a very tempting option for use against U.S. 
forces. Likewise, the study and practice of deception has 
great value to U.S. forces and should continue to be 
exercised.  A common element in various deception theories 
is the need to know the enemy in order to confirm his 
preconceptions and beliefs with a credible deception story. 
This includes a thorough knowledge of his culture, norms, 
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and biases. Additionally, there are common human 
psychological traits that can aid in analysis. It is 
important prior to planning and executing deception 
operations to not only understand what the adversary is 
thinking, but to also understand the impact that the 
deception will have on the adversarial mind. A successful 
deception may have unintended consequences that should be 
considered.  
C. DEFINITIONS  
While trust is prevalent in human interaction and has 
been the subject of much research and literature across 
numerous disciplines, it remains a difficult concept to 
define.  Various perspectives on the topic will be 
discussed; however, the case study analysis will use Piotr 
Sztompka’s definition of trust. Sztompka (1999) defines 
trust as “a bet about the future contingent actions of 
others” (p. 25).  Trust is not solely a belief, but an 
expectation followed by commitment or action: ‘A’ trusts ‘B’ 
to do (or about) ‘X’ in a certain context or situation. 
Types of commitment, expectations, context, objects of trust 
and grounds for trust will be examined.   
Deception is also seen in all facets of human 
interaction throughout history, and has been the subject of 
numerous studies and theories.  The Merriam-Webster 
dictionary defines deception as the act of convincing 
someone to believe something that is false (“Deception,” 
2009). Military doctrine takes it one step further and 
mentions the objective of deception: “causing the adversary 
to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute 
to the accomplishment of the friendly mission” (Joint 
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Publication 3-13.4, p. vii). For the purposes of this study, 
a deception is an intentional act that causes the target to 
act. Daniel and Herbig (1982) define deception as a 
“deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a 
competitive advantage,” (p. 3) which is a general definition 
for deception that applies to most instances of deception, 
military or not. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
The methodology of this study is to: (1) provide the 
reader with an overview of the topic of trust, focusing on 
Piotr Sztompka’s concept of trust as a framework for 
analysis, (2) examine various theories of deception in order 
to clarify the relevance of trust to deception operations, 
(3) examine various case studies from a trust perspective, 
particularly focusing on how exploiting or undermining trust 
may have played a role in the success of the deception, and 
(4) draw conclusions regarding the effect on future 
operations and the relevancy of trust to the  deception, as 
well as the end objectives. 
It is impossible to fully understand what a deception 
target is thinking when presented with a deception story. He 
may act according to preconceptions and biases, or because 
he thinks that it is in his best interests to do so, or for 
some reason that may be contradictory to what one might 
expect. A deception planner will never have the same picture 
that the target has, or know exactly which information the 
target will accept, refuse or miss. Causality is also 
difficult to ascertain.  
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Some trust theories focus on trust being a belief and 
not an action. This study, however, will use Sztompka’s 
definition of trust—that trust consists of a belief or 
expectation that is followed by a commitment or action by 
the target—a bet (1999). The intent is to examine the trust 
that a deception target may have placed in a person, channel 
and/or message and how that contributed to the target’s 
deception. The final case study will look at an example of 
how trust can be damaged intentionally, or undermined, by 
deception.   
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into five chapters.  The first 
chapter provides an overview and introduction. The second 
chapter of this thesis presents an overview of trust. 
Several concepts of trust are presented, with a short 
description of the limitations of each. Next, the definition 
and trust model to be used in the case study analysis will 
be presented.  The third chapter presents an overview of 
deception, both from the military and academic perspectives. 
The importance of the adversarial mind to a successful 
deception is emphasized. The intent of this chapter is to 
present the reader with a discussion of why trust is 
relevant in discussions of deception. The fourth chapter 
presents several case studies and analyzes them using the 
trust framework presented in chapter one. In all of the case 
studies, the target of the deception placed trust in certain 
individuals, channels or messages, which made them 
vulnerable to deception and exploitation of trust. The final 
case is an example of how deception was also used to 
undermine trust in an organization.  Chapter V offers 
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conclusions and insights about how consideration of trust 
can be helpful to the planning and analysis of deception 
operations and how exploitation or the undermining of trust 
may affect future operations.  
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II. TRUST 
A. BACKGROUND OF TRUST 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines trust as assured 
reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of 
someone or something, one in which confidence is placed, or 
the dependence on something future or contingent (“Trust,” 
2009). Trust has been recognized as essential in human 
interactions. Good (1988) notes “...the clear and simple 
fact that, without trust, the everyday social life which we 
take for granted is simply not possible” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 
ix). Despite a general consensus of the prevalence of trust 
and distrust in human interactions, there are many different 
definitions and conceptions as to what trust is.   
Trust has recently been the focus of research and 
studies across several disciplines. “For the last decade or 
so, the problem of trust has come to the fore of 
sociological attention” (Sztompka, 1999, p. ix). Several 
works discuss the reasons that the topic of trust has gained 
interest in the last decade. One proposed reason that 
reliance on trust has increased in today’s world is that 
“the dependence of society’s future on decision making has 
increased” (Luhmann, 1994, p. xii). Sztompka (1999) also 
attributes the increased demand for and focus on trust to 
the growing interdependency of our world, “As our dependence 
on the cooperation of others grows, so does the importance 
of trust in their reliability” (p. 12). Other compelling 
reasons to consider trust focus on the complexity, ignorance 
and uncertainty that exist. Increasing technological 
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complexity can result in unpredictability and unintended 
consequences, and coping with that raised vulnerability in 
the “risk society” requires an enlarged pool of trust 
(Sztompka, 1999).  Additionally, Sztompka (1999) mentions 
several factors that increase the uncertainty and complexity 
of society and cause an increased reliance on trust: the 
number of options that exist; the “opaqueness and complexity 
of institutions, organizations, and technological systems”; 
the “anonymity and impersonality of those we depend on”; and 
“the growth of unfamiliar people in our environment”  (p. 
13-14).  Gambetta (2000) notes: “The condition of ignorance 
or uncertainty about other people’s behavior is central to 
the notion of trust” (p. 218).  
B. CONCEPTIONS OF TRUST 
Despite considerable effort to define trust, “a 
concise, universally accepted definition or conception of 
trust has remained elusive” (Kramer, 1999, p. 571). A common 
thread in most conceptions of trust is that it is a 
psychological state (Kramer, 1999).  This section will give 
a brief overview of several conceptions of trust in the 
social sciences.  
1. Trust as a Psychological State 
One theory of trust views it as a psychological state 
rather than a choice or behavior.  Some conceptualizations 
of trust as a psychological state focus on cognitive 
orientations such as vulnerability and risk due to 
uncertainty in interactions with others (Kramer, 1999).  
Other definitions emphasize the attitude or expectations 
that people have about others and the social system in which 
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they exist (Kramer, 1999). Rousseau et al. (1998) defines 
trust as follows: “Trust is a psychological state comprising 
the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (p. 
395).  
2. Trust as a Rational Choice 
Several trust theorists treat trust as a choice 
behavior. In rational-choice theory of trust, both the 
truster and trustee are rational actors attempting to 
maximize their respective gains by rational calculations 
utilizing available information (Sztompka, 1999).  “From the 
perspective of rational choice theory, decisions about trust 
are similar to other forms of risky choice; individuals are 
presumed to be motivated to make rational, efficient 
choices...”(Kramer, 1999, p. 572).  The rational choice 
model of trust is useful because it focuses on behavior—
trust decisions are observable behaviors (Kramer, 1999). 
Gambetta (1988) writes: 
When we say we trust someone or that someone is 
trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the 
probability that he will perform an action that 
is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us 
is high enough for us to consider engaging in 
some form of cooperation with him. (p. 217) 
Hardin presents an encapsulated interest theory, which 
considers both the knowledge that enables one to trust 
another and the incentive of the person trusted (trustee) to 
fulfill the trust.  In the encapsulated interest theory, the 
truster believes the trustee will fulfill his expectation 
because it will be in the trustee’s own interest to do so 
(2006). 
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One commonality of trust exchanges is the presence of 
uncertainty or risk. Without uncertainty or risk, making a 
bet by trusting another person would be unnecessary. Placing 
a bet of trust is made to maximize gain and minimize loss. 
Coleman notes: 
If the chance of losing, relative to the chance 
of winning is greater than the amount that would 
be won (if he wins), relative to the amount that 
would be lost (if he loses), then by abstaining 
from the bet he has an expected gain; and if he 
is rational, he would withdraw trust. 
(paraphrased in Sztompka, 1999, p. 61) 
Criticism of the rational-choice theory and its 
application to disciplines such as sociology and psychology 
focuses on certain human behavior that deviates from 
rationality.  Theorists such as Cook and Emerson (1978) 
“show that the norms of trust and justice that individuals 
use in their actions have a moral force that runs counter to 
purely rational considerations” (Browning et al., 2000, p. 
134). Cultural norms also are an important factor in 
trusting, and are problematic in viewing trust as a purely 
rational act—“Normative rules in the cultural context also 
encourage or discourage trusting, and are not sufficiently 
explained by the rational choice model of trust or in a 
psychological view of trust” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 66). The 
rational choice view of trust also suggests the need for 
complete knowledge of an individual’s trustworthiness and 
the risks involved. 
3. Trust as Moral 
The basis for the moral conception of trust is that 
trust extends beyond trusting those that we know well and 
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deem trustworthy. A moral concept of trust explains the fact 
that we do trust strangers, without sufficient knowledge to 
make an informed, rational decision to trust. In this view, 
trust is independent of personal knowledge, experience or 
previous interactions.  In his book “The Moral Foundations 
of Trust,” Eric Uslaner (2002) argues that “we must have 
positive views of strangers, of people who are different 
from ourselves and presume that they are trustworthy” (p. 
2). Unlike theories that argue trust is a choice toward 
someone we deem trustworthy, or that focus on instrumental 
or strategic reasons why one should trust another (p. 3), 
the moral conception of trust is not based on the truster’s 
experience but on the belief that “most people can be 
trusted” (p. 3).   
The concept of trust as a moral value is criticized in 
other writings on trust for its conclusion that society 
would be better off it people were more trusting. Hardin 
(2006) and Gambetta (2000) both cite examples of how 
sometimes less trust is desirable, as placing trust in the 
wrong hands can be dangerous.  
4. Non-Cognitive Trust 
Uncertainty may make it impossible to make a rational 
calculation of the risks of placing trust. Another theory of 
trust, non-cognitive trust, is a theory that seeks to 
explain some of the more irrational instances of trust. Non-
cognitive trust is difficult to explain with any theory- 
non-cognitive trust includes learned behaviors, but also 




in Becker (1996) and Jones (1996).  Lawrence Becker (1996) 
makes this distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive 
trust:  
Let us call our trust ‘cognitive’ if it is 
fundamentally a matter of our beliefs or 
expectations about others’ trustworthiness; it is 
non-cognitive if it is fundamentally a matter of 
our having trustful attitudes, affects, emotions, 
or motivational structures that are not focused 
on specific people, institutions or groups. (p. 
50) 
Where cognitive theories of trust express A trusts B to 
do X in situation S, non-cognitive trust would express A’s 
attitude toward B as X, or A’s attitude toward B is trustful 
(Becker, 1996, p. 45). Non-cognitive trust is trust in a 
person independent of our “beliefs or expectations of their 
trustworthiness” (Becker, 1996, 50).   
Non-cognitive trust is a personality trait or quality 
of the person placing the trust, and not a relationship or 
exchange between the parties (Sztompka, 2001, p. 65). A 
criticism of defining trust as a non-cognitive 
characteristic is noted by Hardin (2002), who points out the 
difficulty in separating non-cognitive trust from cognitive 
trust, and the limited utility in explanation of any 
behavior (p. 69).  
C. SZTOMPKA’S DEFINITION AND TRUST FACTORS 
In Trust:  A Sociological Theory, Piotr Sztompka takes 
stock of the existing conceptions of trust and provides 
“conceptual and typological clarifications...of the notion 
of trust” (p. x). The resulting trust theory addresses the 
uncertainty, vulnerability, and risk of our interactions 
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with others—characteristics that make trust necessary.  The 
trust theory proposed recognizes that making a bet of trust 
is not always a rational choice—often one must resort to 
expectations, clues of trustworthiness, and in psychological 
or cultural phenomena such as trusting impulse or trust 
culture when placing trust. 
Sztompka (1999) defines trust as “a bet about the 
future contingent actions of others” (p. 25).  The act of 
trusting consists of two main components: beliefs about how 
someone will perform in the future and commitment, or the 
action of placing the bet on the anticipated performance 
(Sztompka, 1999, p. 25). Similarly, Sztompka treats distrust 
as the “negative mirror-image of trust” and a “negative bet” 
(p. 26).  
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a bet as 
“something that is laid, staked, or pledged typically 
between two parties on the outcome of a contest or a 
contingent issue, a wager, the act of giving such a pledge” 
(“bet,” 2009).  Placing a bet requires some expectation of 
the outcome, usually involving a favorable outcome for the 
person placing the bet.  Sztompka mentions two types of 
expectations involved in bets of trust—reciprocity and 
benign conduct (1999).  Reciprocity is the expectation that 
the trust conferred will be fulfilled, and even returned, to 
the truster (Sztompka, 1999).    Benign conduct is the type 
of expectation involved when the conduct of the trustee is 
completely independent of the trust placed in them 
(Sztompka, 1999). One bases their trust on a certain 
expectation of an individual, but the individual will act or 
perform the same, regardless of whether trusted or not.  
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Sztompka focuses on the second category, expectations of 
benign conduct, and describes three types of these 
expectations:  instrumental, axiological and fiduciary.  
1. Types of Expectations  
a. Instrumental Expectations 
Instrumental trust is based on the expectations 
that actions taken by the target of trust will exhibit 
certain qualities, regardless of the trust placed in them. 
Examples of instrumental expectations are: regularity, or 
the expectation that an individual or object’s performance 
will be consistent; reasonableness; and efficiency 
(Sztompka, 1999). Some instrumental expectations incur more 
risk than others (Sztompka, 1999).  
b. Axiological Expectations 
Axiological trust is based on the expectation that 
actions performed by others will exhibit certain moral 
qualities. These qualities vary in risk, and include the 
expectation that a target of trust will be morally 
responsible, kind and humane, truthful, fair and just 
(Sztompka, 1999). Sztompka notes that these expectations are 
more demanding and incur greater risk, “generally speaking, 
betting on the moral virtues of others is more risky than 
believing in their basic rationality” (p. 54).  
c. Fiduciary Expectations 
The third type of expectation—fiduciary refers to 
the expectation that the trusted will act in a manner that 
places the interests of the trusted before their own 
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(Sztompka, 1999, p. 54).  Fiduciary often refers to a person 
who is entrusted with something, often money, and is 
expected to act in good faith and sometimes against his or 
her own interests to benefit the interests of the truster 
(Sztompka, 1999).  Sztompka notes three examples of 
fiduciary behavior:  disinterestedness, representative 
actions, benevolence and generosity (p. 54).  A bet based on 
fiduciary expectation is particularly risky; people will 
more likely act rationally or morally than place interests 
of another person above their own.  
2. Types of Commitment 
According to Sztompka (1999), trusting involves three 
types of commitment:  anticipatory, responsive, and 
evocative. Anticipatory trust is the trust involved in a bet 
that our needs and interests will be met by others “just 
doing what they normally routinely do” (p. 27). Examples of 
this type of trust may be the trust we confer in doctors, 
law enforcement personnel, politicians, etc. “It does not 
imply an obligation on the part of the trusted, who may not 
even be aware of the trust placed in her” (Hardin, 1991, p. 
198).  Sztompka (1999) defines responsive trust as a bet 
that requires a “specific, voluntary obligation to care” on 
the part of the trusted; “entrusting some valuable object to 
somebody else, with his or her consent; giving up one’s 
control over that object...and expecting responsible care” 
(p. 26).  The third type of commitment, or evocative trust, 
is when we act on the belief that our trust will be 
reciprocated (Sztompka, 1999).  These three types of 
commitment can be present in various degrees and strengths.   
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3. Objects of Trust 
There are several primary objects, or targets, of 
trust:  others that we come into contact with (interpersonal 
trust); people that we do not come into direct contact with 
(social trust); social categories (groups of people sharing 
common traits); social roles (ways of acting typical for 
specific positions); social group (“plurality of persons 
kept together by specific social bonds”); institutions and 
organizations; technological systems; products and utensils 
that we purchase and use; and finally, the most abstract—
overall qualities of the social system, social order, or the 
regime (Sztompka, 1999, p. 43). Additionally, there are 
secondary objects of trust, such as witnesses, experts, and 
“agents of accountability” that are relied upon in bets of 
trust on the objects mentioned above (Sztompka, 1999).   
4. Grounds for Trust 
Often, when an individual must make a decision about 
whether to trust, the trustworthiness of the trustee is not 
known. In this situation, a truster must look for cues to 
aid in the decision. Sztompka presents several cues that 
encourage people to trust or distrust, or to choose specific 
types of trust.  Luhmann (1979) notes: 
The cues employed to form trust do not eliminate 
the risk, they simply make it less.  They do not 
supply complete information about the likely 
behavior of the person to be trusted.  They 
simply serve as a springboard for the leap into 
uncertainty. (as cited in Sztompka, 1999, p. 69)  
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Three grounds on which decisions to grant or withhold 
trust may be based on are: reflected trustworthiness, 
agential trustfulness or derived trustworthiness, and trust 
culture (Sztompka, 1999).   
a. Reflected Trustworthiness 
Reflected trustworthiness is perhaps the most 
important and most common ground for trust, and is based on 
the perceived trustworthiness of the trustee (Sztompka, 
1999).  The estimated trustworthiness of a potential target 
of trust can be based on reputation, performance and/or 
appearance.   
Trust may be based on the reputation of the 
potential target of trust or the record of their past 
performance with regard to trust. Reputation may be either 
first- or second-hand, and may refer to past conduct, 
instances of meeting trust, or reciprocating trust 
(Sztompka, 1999, p. 72).  Often an individual does not have 
first-hand knowledge of a potential trustee, and may rely on 
clues such as testimonies, credentials, references, social 
proof, recommendations, etc. (Sztompka, 1999).  As with the 
other clues of trustworthiness, reputation is able to be 
manipulated- credentials can be faked, reviews and 
recommendations can be exaggerated, and second-hand sources 
may be wrong.  
The second category of reflected trustworthiness 
is performance.  Unlike reputation, which considers a 
potential target’s past trustworthy behavior, performance is 
concerned with current deeds, conduct and results (Sztompka, 
1999, p. 77). There are many situations in which looking at 
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present performance is more effective in assessing the 
potential trustworthiness of a target. This basis for trust 
can be manipulated, as an individual may act in a manner 
inconsistent with their reputation, or out of character to 
achieve a certain objective. Some financial scams may use 
actual or inflated current performance to deceive a 
potential target into investing their life savings.   
Appearance is the third type of reflected 
trustworthiness.  There are two broad categories that 
provide indications of personality, identity and status and 
thus provide cues to trust:  appearance and demeanor  
(Sztompka, 1999). When deciding whether to place trust, cues 
such as dress, cleanliness, self-conduct, age, gender, race, 
possessions, status and demeanor play a large part. People 
tend to trust individuals similar to themselves, or those 
who look authoritative or even attractive (Sztompka, 1999).  
Like Reputation and performance, appearance can also be 
deceiving. There are many examples of appearance being used 
to increase an individual’s perceived trustworthiness in 
order to deceive another. Status and authority are often 
used in advertising and scams.  Law enforcement personnel go 
undercover or in disguise to catch criminals.   Whaley and 
Samter (2006) note that the manipulation of nonverbal 
behavior explains why some people are successful liars. 
“Research suggests that successful liars are those who 
maintain eye contact, display a forward body lean, smile, 
and orient their bodies toward the other person” (p.55).  
b. Derived Trustworthiness 
In addition to the three bases of primary 
trustworthiness, trust can also be grounded in external 
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factors that have influence on trustworthiness. Sztompka 
refers to these trust enhancing conditions as ‘derived 
trustworthiness’ and includes three types: accountability of 
the trustees, pre-commitment, and trust-inducing situations 
(Sztompka, 1999, p. 87).   
Accountability refers to the “enforcement of 
trustworthiness” by external monitoring of the trustee’s 
conduct (Sztompka, 1999, p. 87). Accountability can be 
provided by formal or informal means, and encourages an 
individual to be trustworthy by insuring trustworthy 
behavior and punishing breaches of trust. Contracts, 
guarantees, agreements, and informal understandings are all 
types of accountability that can aid in making a bet of 
trust (Sztompka, 1999).  The second type of derived 
trustworthiness, pre-commitment, is a special case of 
accountability where a trustee willingly restrains his 
actions in order to increase trustworthiness (Sztompka, 
1999, p. 91). This could involve voluntarily reducing one’s 
freedom or rights in a contract, paying membership dues, or 
paying a refundable deposit to borrow an item or rent 
property.  Finally, there are other cues to aid in the 
decision of whether to trust that are situational. There are 
certain environments that make one more or less likely to 
assess a potential trustee as trustworthy.  Small, close-
knit communities are more conductive to trust than societies 
where secrecy and anonymity are prevalent; sacred settings 
such as churches are more so than subway stations, and 
locations such as a highway, where a breach of trust may be 
devastating to the trustee, more so than a more benign 
setting (Sztompka, 1999). These three cues for trust 
facilitate trust in certain situations when the truster may 
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not otherwise trust the trustee to do X, such as when an 
assessment of trustworthiness is not possible.  
c. Trusting Impulse 
In addition to the estimation of trustworthiness 
that a truster makes, there is an additional ground for 
trust that stems from the psychological tendency to trust. 
This is referred to as a “trusting impulse” (Sztompka, 
1999). The tendency to trust or distrust is formed through 
an individual’s accumulated experiences of having trust met 
or breached (Sztompka, 1999).  
d. Trust Culture 
Trust can also be grounded in the values or norms 
of a culture.  Trust culture is not based on the experiences 
or psychological disposition of an individual, but rather 
the collective or typical experiences of members of a given 
culture over a long period of time (Sztompka, 1999, p. 99). 
Over time, trust culture is formed through a society’s 
accumulated negative or positive experiences with trust. 
Sztompka gives five societal circumstances that contribute 
to trust culture:  normative coherence, stability of the 
social order, transparency of the social order, familiarity 
of the environment and the accountability of other people 
and institutions (1999). These characteristics of the 
culture coupled with the societal mood and collective 





Figure 1.   Representation of Sztompka’s Trust Model 
5. Trust Model Based on Sztompka’s Concept of Trust 
Sztompka’s concept of trust is useful for this study 
because it provides a clear framework based on evolving 
trust research, and incorporates three dimensions of trust:  
trust as relationship, trust as a personality trait and 
trust as a cultural phenomenon. Despite the fact that humans 
are rational beings and often act toward fulfilling self-
interest in rational ways, factors such as psychological 
biases and cultural factors also have a large impact on 
whether a person trusts or not.  It is not always possible 
to assess one’s trustworthiness prior to making a bet of 
trust; in many instances, one must rely on various 
expectations and cues to lessen the risk.  
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III. THE ROLE OF TRUST IN A DECEPTION 
A. BACKGROUND OF DECEPTION 
Deception is defined as the act of deceiving, or the 
act of convincing another to believe information that is 
false (“deception,” 2008). Caddell (2004) notes, “deception 
is a traditional component of political and military 
conflict,” and like trust it is also “intrinsic to human 
interaction” (p. 1). Latimer (2001) notes that “everyone 
employs deception at times, either to gain an advantage or 
for more altruistic reasons...deception is such an integral 
part of our lives that we often fail to recognize it” (p. 
1).  
Deception in warfare is likely as old as warfare itself 
(Caddell, 2004). History from biblical times forward is 
replete with examples of how deception enabled victory— 
often by a weaker force. Some of the most dramatic, large-
scale deceptions are those that took place during World War 
II, such as Operation Bodyguard. Deception can still be used 
effectively today. A few of the more recent examples include 
deceptions during the Six-Day War of 1967, the Yom Kippur 
War of 1973, Hezbollah’s use of deception against Israeli 
Forces in Lebanon, deception during Desert Storm, Kosovo, 
and the 2008 Colombian hostage rescue.  In addition to 
deception in warfare, there are many examples of political 
deceptions, deceptions by other agencies such as the FBI and 
CIA, and deceptions by various other groups, organizations 
and individuals.  
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B. PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION 
Generally, deception involves techniques such as 
camouflage, concealment, feints, demonstrations, ruses and 
displays to convey selected information to the adversary 
with the objective of gaining an advantage. Deception occurs 
at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of 
warfare. Deception can be passive, consisting of camouflage 
and concealment, or active, conveying certain information or 
indicators to the adversary. Most theories of deception 
recognize the importance of knowing the adversary—including 
his preconceived beliefs, expectations, thought processes, 
and channels of information. Other factors such as security, 
secrecy and credibility of the deception story are common to 
most literature on deception. This section will introduce 
both military and academic theories of deception and discuss 
their relevance to trust. 
1. JP 3-13.4 Military Deception 
Military deception doctrine defines MILDEC as “those 
actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision 
makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions and 
operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific 
actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the 
accomplishment of the friendly mission” (Joint Publication 
(JP) 3-13.4, 2006, p. vii). There are six principles to 
MILDEC:  focus, objective, centralized planning and control, 
security, timeliness and integration.  Focus refers to the 
targeting of adversarial decision makers—using conduits or 
channels that will affect their information, information 
systems and decision-making. Conduits refer to the systems, 
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organizations and individuals through which information 
reaches the adversarial decision maker (JP 3-13.4, 2006). 
MILDEC planning doctrine focuses on the adversary’s 
behavior, and proposes a “See, Think, Do” Deception 
Methodology (JP 3-13.4, 2006, p. IV-1). This concept is a 
“cognitive process in the target’s mind that leads to target 
decisions that result in adversary actions that are 
advantageous to the (deception planners)” (JP 3-13.4, 2006, 
IV-1). This methodology is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Military Deception as a Three-Tiered 
Cognitive Process (From JP 3-13.4) 
2. Daniel and Herbig, “Propositions on Military 
Deception” 
Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig define deception as 
the “deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a 
competitive advantage” (1982, p. 155). This theory of 
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deception emphasizes the role of the receiver in the 
deception—in order for one to be deceived one must believe 
the false story that is being told.  Furthermore, three 
goals of a deception are presented:  to condition a target’s 
beliefs, to influence the target’s actions, and to benefit 
the deceiver from the target’s actions (Daniel & Herbig, 
1982, p. 157).  This is similar to the JP 3-13.4 three-
tiered cognitive process above. 
Daniel and Herbig distinguish two types of deception, 
“A-type” or “ambiguity-increasing,” and “M-type,” or 
“misleading.” Deceptions do not have to be limited to one or 
the other, and can have elements of both. The objective of 
A-type deceptions is to increase uncertainty and prevent an 
adversary from determining the deceiver’s goal or 
intentions. It is not sufficient for the falsehoods of an A-
type deception to simply disseminate indicators and 
information—they must be “plausible enough and consequential 
enough to the target’s well-being that the target cannot 
ignore them” (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 157).  “M-type” 
deceptions decrease ambiguity by causing a deception target 
to focus on one wrong alternative (Daniel & Herbig, 1982). 
One example of a successful M-type deception was Fortitude 
South. This was the deception during WWII to convince Hitler 
that the Allied Forces main effort would be in Pas de 
Calais, and that Normandy was just a diversionary attack. 
Daniel and Herbig’s theory makes a distinction from 
other theories in their assertion that the initial target of 
a military deception is usually a state’s intelligence 
organization (1982), though they do recognize the decision 
maker as the ultimate deception target. Figure 2 shows the 
 27
channels that link the deceiver and the target.  These 
channels make deception possible, and may include conduits 
such as a newspaper or radio channel monitored by the 
target, reconnaissance satellites, electronic intercept 
systems, diplomats or spies (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 159).  
The deceiver sends signals and planted clues and evidence 
through these channels to the target. (See Figure 2) There 
are several possibilities for the signals transmitted 
through these channels, they may be received intact, 
garbled, modified, misinterpreted or dismissed (Daniel & 
Herbig, 1982).  A deceiver must expect that some of the 
signals may not make it to the target, may be misinterpreted 
or discarded (Daniel & Herbig, 1982). Feedback channels, 
(Figure 2) if present, may help determine the effectiveness 
of the signals. 
Daniel and Herbig (1982) also discuss five categories 
conditioning the success of deception:  Secrecy, 
organization, and coordination; plausibility and 
confirmation; adaptability; predispositions of the target; 
and factors in the strategic situation (p. 167).   
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Figure 3.   The Process of Deception (After Figure 1.2, 
Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 160) 
3. Barton Whaley  
In Toward a General Theory of Deception, Barton Whaley 
presents what he refers to as the “first comprehensive 
attempt at deception theory,” which is based on analysis of 
two fields in which deception is prevalent:  the military 
and magic (Whaley, 1982, p. 178). Regardless of the field, 
Whaley asserts that all deceptions are applied psychology, 
specifically the “psychology of misperception,” and 
therefore can be addressed in a general theory (1982). 
Whaley (1982) defines deception as information designed to 
manipulate the behavior of others by inducing them to accept 
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a false or distorted presentation of their environment. 
Deceptions consist of two parts, simulation and 
dissimulation.  Dissimulation refers to hiding the real; 
simulation involves showing the false (1982). Whaley (1982) 
notes that both simulation and dissimulation are present in 
all deceptions.  Dissimulation can be divided into three 
categories: masking, repackaging and dazzling.  Similarly, 
simulating can be categorized as mimicking, inventing or 
decoying. Whaley proposes a process of deception that 
consists of ten steps:  knowing the strategic goal, deciding 
the desired reaction and the desired perception, deciding 
what to hide and what to show, analyzing the pattern to be 
hidden and the pattern to be shown, exploring the means 
available, handing off the plan to operational units, 
communicating through target channels, and the acceptance of 
the deception by the target (pp. 188-189). 
4. Walter Jajko 
In Deception:  Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on 
Doctrine; Preface to Planning, Jajko defines deception as 
“the manipulation of an opponent through the employment of 
stratagem” (p. 353).  Jajko (2002) points to surprise as a 
key element in gaining advantage over an adversary, although 
an adversary’s vulnerabilities provide the potential for 
deception (p. 353).   
Like other deception theorists, Jajko notes that the 
target of a deception is the adversarial decision maker,
specifically the decision-maker’s mind.  Deception is 
inherently psychological as it creates and reinforces 
perceptions, and “affects the cognitive, emotional and 
motivational processes,” but its objective is to provoke 
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action or inaction through the use of simulation or 
dissimulation (Jajko, 2002). The overall objectives of a 
deception are to hide friendly weaknesses and intentions, 
exaggerate strength, and to cause the enemy to misdirect 
strength, increase uncertainty or confirm certainty (Jajko, 
2002). In order to create or reinforce the adversary’s 
perceptions, the deception must be “credible, verifiable and 
feasible” (Jajko, 2002, p. 354).   
Much of Jajko’s focus is on the United States’ 
reluctance to accept and use deception in political and 
military conflict despite its power and value. Five 
essential conditions for the sustained ability to conduct 
deception are listed: apparatus, policy, philosophy, 
practitioners, and practice (Jajko, 2002, p. 354). Perhaps 
most relevant to this study of doctrine is Jajko’s six 
steps of the planning process. A rigid, meticulous, six-
step process is outlined, consisting of the following 
steps: (1) determine purposes and objectives, (2) establish 
why deception is warranted, (3) make a thorough assessment 
of the target, (4) develop a deception strategy, (5) 
produce a detailed schedule, and (6) ensure that the 
conclusion of the deception is planned for (Jajko, 2002).  
Jajko (2002) notes the importance of assessing the 
adversary, particularly his expectations and inclinations:  
One must understand the ethnic, intellectual, and 
ethical wells of his understanding. It must be 
remembered that the adversary’s perceptions, his 
view of reality, his understanding of the 
available information and of one’s motivation 
will be determined in part by his language, 
history, geography, education, experience, 
modernity, methods, doctrines, beliefs, values, 
and vanities, in short, his culture and 
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psychology—and his religion or ideology—which 
often are disregarded by those in a secular and 
pluralistic society. (p. 359) 
This illustrates perhaps the biggest challenge in 
planning and conducting a deception operation. The tendency 
to “mirror-image” can lead to self-deception; understanding 
is critical. A variety of methods may be necessitated to 
gain an understanding of the deception target. 
5. Richard Heuer, “Cognitive Factors in Deception 
and Counterdeception” 
Heuer (1981) states, “To be successful, deception must 
achieve a desired impact upon the thinking of the deception 
target, either a national or military decision maker...” (p. 
1) In order to accomplish this goal, one must understand the 
thought processes of the target. Richard Heuer’s analysis 
focuses on examining common perceptual biases and 
tendencies.  Because people lack the capability to deal with 
all the complexities of the world, simplifying strategies 
are employed to make judgments and decisions.  Often these 
perceptions diverge from reality and can be referred to as 
biases, or predictable errors in judgment (Heuer, 1981). 
Heuer’s analysis is limited to discussion of perceptual and 
cognitive bias.  His intent is to examine how to exploit 
this knowledge by deceiving and how to prevent being 
deceived (Heuer, 1981, p. 33). 
One’s perception of reality is influenced by a number 
of factors that include past experience, education, values, 
and role requirements as well as other stimuli (Heuer, 
1981). Central to Heuer’s discussion of perceptual bias is 
the principle that people perceive what they expect to 
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perceive.  Expectations are based on various experiences, 
training, norms, situations and influences.  “Patterns of 
expectation, rooted in past experience and training, tell 
us, subconsciously, what to look for, what is important, and 
how to interpret what we see” (Heuer, 1981, p. 35).  These 
patterns are referred to as a “mind-set”.  Heuer notes that 
a mind-set is unavoidable and is resistant to change; new 
information is conditioned by existing perceptions and old 
perceptions are hard to lose (Heuer, 1981, p. 37).   
Heuer (1981) examines several cognitive biases:  biases 
in estimating probabilities, availability bias, anchoring 
bias, overconfidence bias, and bias toward causal 
explanation. Availability bias is a probability estimate 
that is based on how easily one can recall or imagine an 
event (Heuer, 1981). This ability to imagine a certain 
scenario is limited by part experience or memories of a 
similar scenario. Anchoring bias involves the selection of a 
natural, approximate starting judgment around which further 
information and analysis is “anchored” (Heuer, 1981). 
Overconfidence bias is a result of people thinking that they 
are more certain than they actually are Heuer, 1981).  
Each of these biases has the potential to be exploited 
in deceptions.  As mentioned by several theorists, it is 
much easier to reinforce what the target believes rather 
than to change their mind.  Availability bias may make a 
target believe that deception is more common than it is and 
be more inclined to perceive it (Heuer, 1981). This seems to 
be the case with the Germans while Operation Mincemeat in 
WWII was very fresh in their memory.   
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Heuer also notes “impressions tend to persist even 
after the evidence that created those impressions is fully 
discredited” (Heuer, 1981, p. 53).  This explains why 
“impressions created from information passed by a channel 
such as a double agent may persist even after it is revealed 
that the source cannot be trusted” (Heuer, 1981).  
C. MANIPULATING TRUST THROUGH DECEPTION 
This section examines two objectives of using deception 
to manipulate trust:  (1) creating trust in a deception 
target when that trust is not deserved, and (2) undermining 
existing trust relationships in target networks. 
1. Creating Trust for the Purpose of Exploitation 
Sztompka’s referral to trust as a bet implies that 
there is risk involved in trusting. And with any bet, there 
is a chance of losing.  There is always a chance in placing 
our trust in someone, that we may make a mistake or be taken 
advantage of. “Placing trust, that is, making bets about the 
future uncertain and uncontrollable actions of others, is 
always accompanied by risk” (Kollock, 1994, p. 317).  
Some of the reasons for our increased reliance on trust 
that were mentioned earlier;complexity, uncertainty, and 
increased technology increase the risks of trusting and the 
possibility of deception.  In his book Influence:  the 
Psychology of Persuasion, Robert Cialdini writes: 
Because technology can evolve much faster than we 
can, our natural capacity to process information 
is likely to be increasingly inadequate to handle 
the surfeit of change, choice, and challenge that 
is characteristic of modern life... When making a 
decision, we will less frequently enjoy the 
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luxury of a fully considered analysis of the 
total situation but will revert increasingly to a 
focus on a single, usually reliable feature of 
it. (Cialdini, 1993, p. 278)  
Cialdini (1993) notes a possible hazard in trusting in 
these cues: “the problem comes when something causes the 
normally trustworthy cues to counsel us poorly, to lead us 
to erroneous actions and wrongheaded decisions” (p. 278). 
As mentioned earlier, there are certain expectations or 
cues that trust can be based on.  Sztompka (1999) mentions 
three types of expectations that trust may be based on:  
instrumental, moral or axiological. Each of these 
expectations involves a certain degree of risk, and brings 
with it the possibility of deception.  Instrumental 
expectations involve expectations of benign conduct, such as 
the trustee acting reasonably, efficiently, etc. (1999). 
Expectations involving moral qualities are a little riskier.  
One can trust their spouse to be truthful or trust a 
politician to not embezzle, but frequently these 
expectations are taken advantage of by liars or deceivers.  
Finally, fiduciary or axiological expectations are the 
riskiest of all. Encouraging a person to expect that someone 
is concerned about the person’s welfare more than their own, 
or that they are acting in the person’s best interest rather 
than for self-serving purposes are two ways that a person’s 
fiduciary expectations may be taken advantage of. 
Manipulating a person’s expectations so that they trust you 
to do one thing (act in good faith, for example), and 
instead you do something else (cheat) is the basis for most 
deception. 
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In Strategic Denial and Deception, Godson and Wirtz 
note that diplomatic channels can be effective for 
deception. Diplomats have to be able to do some amount of 
business with each other, which requires some degree of 
trust.  As a result, personal relationships that facilitate 
this activity result, and despite the fact that a diplomat 
may represent an adversary country, he may be thought of as 
“not such a bad fellow,” and unlikely to tell an outright 
lie (Godson and Wirtz, 2002, pp. 21-22). Godson and Wirtz 
(2002) write,  “this creates the possibility of passing 
false signals that will, nevertheless, be believed” (p. 22).  
The expectation that diplomatic activity is occurring may 
also present opportunities for exploitation.  Godson and 
Wirtz (2002) point out that in late 1941,  
Japanese diplomats in Washington were continuing 
to negotiate even as the rest of their government 
prepared to launch an attack on U.S. forces at 
Pearl Harbor.  This served a deceptive purpose, 
since it suggested that Japan had not yet taken 
the decision to go to war against the United 
States. (p. 22) 
Coincidentally, Stalin also managed to reinforce 
Japanese expectations of a negotiation of terms in 1945 when 
he sent messages through diplomatic channels in response to 
a Japanese invitation to be a party to negotiating a 
conditional surrender between Japan and the Allies (Godson & 
Wirtz, 2002, p. 85). The negotiations led to the Japanese 
expectation of a negotiation or perhaps an ultimatum on 
August 8, 1945, but not a declaration of war (Godson & 
Wirtz, 2002, p. 85). 
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Gaining one’s confidence in order to defraud or deceive 
is sometimes referred to as a confidence game or trick.  
Although this type of fraud has probably been in existence 
forever, the term “confidence man” came into use in the 
1800s. Often appeals to one’s weaknesses such as greed or 
vanity are used, but virtues such as honesty, or the 
expectation of good faith are also susceptible (“confidence 
trick,” 2009). Victor Lustig must have gained the trust of 
the French businessmen when he successfully “sold” the 
Eiffel Tower in 1925 (“Victor Lustig,” 2009); similarly, 
George Parker when he sold various New York City landmarks 
to tourists (Cohen, 2005).  
An individual may look to certain cues such as 
appearance, performance or reputation to assess 
trustworthiness. Frequently these cues are used to gain the 
confidence of a truster. In Trust and Trustworthiness, 
Hardin uses an example from the movie Six Degrees of 
Separation of how the main character (based on the life of 
David Hampton) was able to learn enough about his targets 
and their families to cause them to consider their 
relationship with him as involving trust and trustworthiness 
(Hardin, 2006, p. 81). He led them to believe that he was a 
"good college friend of their children, and they therefore 
treated him as such" (p. 81). Hardin writes: 
The trustworthiness they assumed of him was... 
they thought, reputational, because it was 
grounded in what they thought to be the judgment 
of their own children and in the scam artist’s 
ongoing relationship with those children. (p. 81) 
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In The Art of Deception, Kevin Mitnick credits the 
success of social engineering attacks to the vulnerability 
of human beings to being deceived into misplacing trust by 
manipulation. “The social engineer anticipates suspicion and 
resistance, and he’s always prepared to turn distrust into 
trust...One of his common techniques involves building a 
sense of trust on the part of his victim” (Mitnick, 2002, p. 
41). A social engineer anticipates what a target may ask, 
and can plan his responses to what the target will expect, 
decreasing the chance a target will become suspicious. In 
the examples that Mitnick presents, social engineers clearly 
use trust cues such as those Sztompka mentions to increase 
the appearance of trustworthiness to the target.  Sztompka 
lists various ways in which these cues (and trust) can be 
manipulated:  the glorification of reputation (by historic 
deeds or miracles performed), fabricating credentials 
(medals, degrees, etc), exaltation of performance, and 
aggrandizing appearance (ornate, decorated uniforms, for 
example) or impressing with props or possessions (1999). 
Bell and Whaley (1991) mention four “shortcuts” to a 
doctorate:  false claim, faking documentation, plagiarism, 
and purchasing one (p. 226). A doctorate is regarded as a 
valuable item for establishing reputational trustworthiness. 
Decoy, disguise, camouflage and concealment are all ways 
that appearance can be manipulated. The possibilities for 
exploitation of these primary trust cues seem practically 
limitless.  
Additionally, there are certain other situational 
conditions that can make the bet of trust a little safer:  
accountability of the trustees, pre-commitment, and trust- 
inducing situations (Sztompka, 1999).  Like the primary 
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grounds of trust, these too present the potential for 
manipulation. People may be willing to place their trust in 
someone or something when they perceive there is an agent of 
accountability that will help ensure that trust is met, 
whether a formal agent such as a court, agency, contract or 
treaty; or informal agents such as family, coworkers or 
teammates (Sztompka, 1999). Fraudulent websites or 
organizations may use a trusted logo or agency’s name to 
gain credibility with a consumer. The fraudulent use of the 
Better Business Bureau (BBB) logo has been identified in one 
scam targeting online buyers (“BBB Issues International 
Alert,” 2006). Creating the perception that an agency of 
accountability exists or creating a fake agency of 
accountability may also provide opportunity for exploitation 
through deception.  
Manipulating pre-commitment by appearing to forfeit 
some degree of freedom also presents opportunity. An escrow 
agreement is one type of pre-commitment that is frequently 
made. The Better Business Bureau recently alerted consumers 
about a scam to defraud car buyers out of thousands of 
dollars. This particular scam involved the use of a fake 
escrow service to “protect” a customer and seller’s 
interests when buying a high priced item online. The 
customer wires the money but the car never arrives.  “The 
purpose of an escrow service is to create a safe environment 
where both the buyer and seller feel comfortable exchanging 
money and goods knowing they can’t be taken advantage of,” 
said Steve Cox, BBB spokesperson. “Unfortunately, scammers 
have realized they can cash in on this type of transaction 
by creating a facade of trustworthiness as an escrow 
company” (“BBB Consumer Alert,” 2008).   
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Finally, the situation or setting can be manipulated in 
order to try to gain someone’s trust. Sztompka (1999) 
mentions certain locations or occasions that create 
“psychological inhibitions for potential violators” (p. 95) 
present opportunities for deception.  There is also the 
possibility to convince the truster (deception target) that 
if his or her trust is breached, the trustee (deceiver) will 
suffer severe consequences as well. An example of 
exploitation of situational trust might be taking advantage 
of a suspect’s misplaced trust in what he thinks are fellow 
prisoners, but are actually an informant and a DEA agent 
(United States v. Escobar, 1994). Pablo Escobar may not have 
confided his plans and Medellin associations in another 
situation. 
Sztompka also mentions two grounds for trust that are 
innate to an individual or culture:  trusting impulse and 
trust culture (1999).  Trusting impulse is shaped by life 
experiences with regard to trust.  If an individual had 
trust fulfilled or met consistently throughout his 
experience, he may be more apt to trust.  Conversely, if his 
trust was consistently breached, it may lead to 
suspiciousness or inherent distrust (Sztompka, 1999, p. 98). 
Similarly, trust culture deals with the collective trust 
experiences of a group or society. Certain cultures are more 
trusting than others. While neither of these grounds for 
trust can be created, they do have something to do with 
whether an individual is susceptible to deception, or to 
having their trust exploited. 
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In addition to the exploitation of the various grounds 
that Sztompka describes, trust can also potentially be 
manipulated in other ways.  Trusting someone, or rather, 
displaying trust toward him, may evoke trustworthy behavior, 
but it may also evoke reciprocal trust. Some research has 
shown that when people think they are trusted, they produce 
Oxytocin, which makes them feel positive toward the truster, 
and want to reward them by being trustworthy. In other 
words, when one trusts another, there is a good chance that 
they will reciprocate. In The Neurobiology of Trust, Paul 
Zak writes, “receiving a signal of trust appears to make 
people feel positive about strangers who have trusted them” 
(p. 91).  One way in which someone could take advantage of 
this tendency is by confiding something in an individual 
(falsely) or sharing a juicy piece of fabricated 
intelligence to encourage him or her to reciprocate by 
trusting the deceiver with information.   
2. Undermining Trust by Deception 
Hardin writes that, “Distrust and even merely the lack 
of trust can be very useful and can be strategically 
manipulated” (Hardin, 2002, 103).  Anthony Pagden notes: 
 Although it may be the case that no central 
agency is capable of intentionally creating trust 
where none previously or independently existed, 
it clearly does lie within the power of most 
effectively constituted agencies to destroy it. 
(as cited in Hardin, 2002, 103) 
Hardin (2002) cites several examples of attempts to 
destroy trust:   
For example, the structure of prisons and the 
behavior of prison guards often provoke distrust 
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between prisoners...they can become virtual 
enemies rather than allies who might pose a 
common front against the guards of the system. 
(p. 103) 
Another example that he uses is that of the Spanish 
destruction of Neapolitan society in the 1600s.  “This is a 
remarkably subtle account of how to dissolve trust relations 
within a society while still preserving order in the 
society...”(Hardin, 2002, p. 102).  Robert Nieves writes 
about Pablo Escobar’s paranoia, which caused him to trust no 
one but family and very close friends. Nieves writes, 
Escobar became a fugitive, hunted by the largest 
task force ever assembled in Latin America. 
Living constantly under the threat of arrest, he 
began to suspect treason among his loyal 
surrogates. He murdered several of his closest 
associates. (Godson & Wirtz, 2002, p. 165) 
Escobar’s paranoia and distrust ultimately “closed the 
circle around him tighter and tighter until he was located 
and killed in an armed confrontation with police”  (Godson & 
Wirtz, 2002, p. 165). Pablo Escobar was aware that his 
communications were being monitored, and his communications 
with his closest family and friends are what eventually 
resulted in his demise.   
While these examples pertain to introducing distrust 
but not necessarily by deception, there are examples of how 
deception can be used to damage trust in organizations, 
through infiltration among other methods. Paranoia or 
suspicion alone can result in the destruction of an 
organization or network. The CIA assembled information on 
the Abu Nidal organization and repeatedly contacted his 
agents asking them to work for the United States.  Instead 
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of being rewarded for their loyalty upon reporting the 
approaches, they instead lost the trust of Abu Nidal 
(Ledeen, 2003).  In A Spy for all Seasons, CIA operations 
officer Duane "Dewey" Clarridge writes of how an ambitious 
deception provoked psychotic paranoia in terrorist Abu 
Nidal's mind, causing him to destroy his own organization. 
"On a single night in November of 1987, approximately 170 
[of his own people] were tied up and blindfolded, machine-
gunned, and pushed into a trench prepared for the occasion. 
Another 160 were killed in Libya shortly thereafter" 
(Weisman, 2007).  It is possible that just the idea that an 
organization has been infiltrated or is being monitored can 
do serious damage. 
One example that will be covered in the next chapter 
uses both the creation of trust for exploitation and the 
undermining of existing trust to destabilize an 
organization. The FBI established and exploited trust in 
messages and that were used to undermine the KKK 
organization in the 1960s.  Undermining trust within 
organizations and networks has the potential of destroying 




IV. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
As defined earlier, trust is a bet about the future 
contingent action of others; it is a belief or expectation, 
but also an action.  Additionally, deception is the act of 
convincing someone to believe something that is false; not 
just to cause them to believe, but to act. Trusting leaves 
one vulnerable to risk and exploitation, and a deception 
planner may have the potential to create and/or exploit 
these vulnerabilities. 
Four case studies have been selected to examine the 
relationship between trust and deception; specifically how 
trust may have been exploited or undermined in each case. 
Each case study will focus on the deception target’s 
expectations and the various grounds for trust that may have 
been exploited. 
A. OPERATION JAQUE 
1. The Deception  
Operation Jaque (which means “check” as in “check-
mate”) was a Columbian Military operation that took place on 
July 2, 2008, resulting in the rescue of fifteen hostages 
that had been held by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Columbia (FARC) and the arrest of two FARC members. The 
success of the operation is attributed to a ruse on the FARC 
planned by Columbian Military Intelligence.   
Operation Jaque consisted of the deception plan and a 
contingency plan to attack the rebels in the event that the 
deception failed (Viecco & Camp, 2008).  The deception plan 
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was to trick the FARC leaders into loading the hostages into 
a helicopter that appeared to be a FARC sympathetic NGO in 
order to transfer them to another location (Viecco & Camp, 
2008).  The deception plan was to convince the FARC’s 
regional leader holding the hostages, Gerardo Aguilar (also 
known as “Cesar”), that he was communicating with the new 
FARC leader, that he should round up the hostages into a 
single group and that Cesar and another front leader would 
be transported by a FARC-friendly NGO to another location in 
Columbia where they would meet the new FARC commander, 
Alfonso Cano (Viecco & Camp, 2008). The idea was that the 
leader would use the hostages to restart the negotiation 
process with France and other nations (Luhnow, 2008a).     
The deception of the FARC rebels is a textbook example 
of a recent, effective deception and demonstrates that 
creative and meticulous deception planning can still be 
accomplished today. As Daniel and Herbig (1982) write, 
“deception is a deliberate misrepresentation of reality to 
gain a competitive advantage” (p. 155), and in this case, 
resulted in the release of 15 hostages, the capture of two 
rebels and perhaps irreparable damage to the FARC 
organization.  The deception story appears to have been 
credible; Cesar had no reason for disbelief. This section 
proposes that trust played a role in the outcome and 
discusses the various trust relationships evident in the 
deception. 
2. Targets of Trust and Trust Relationships 
This deception consisted of several smaller deceptions.  
Perhaps the most crucial to the success of the operation was 
the Columbian military infiltration of the FARC 
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communication network.  An elaborate “broken telephone” 
scheme convinced the regional leader Cesar that he was 
communicating with top leaders in the FARC’s 7-man 
secretariat (Luhnow, 2008a). Top guerilla leaders also 
thought they were communicating with Cesar; both were 
actually talking to Colombian Army intelligence (Luhnow, 
2008a).  In terms of Sztompka’s trust framework, Cesar 
trusted his communication network, and was convinced that he 
was communicating with FARC leadership.  This leads to two 
trust relationships: (1) Cesar trusted the communication 
network to convey information accurately (that he was 
communicating with the supreme leader, and the 
communications were not compromised) and (2) Cesar trusted 
the individual that he thought he was communicating with 
(Alfonso Cano) about the transfer of hostages that was to 
occur.   
The next trust relationships that will be examined are 
those that played a part on the day of the rescue. Cesar had 
consolidated three groups of hostages at one location to 
meet the helicopter that would transfer them to a new 
location. He and a fellow rebel would also board the 
helicopter with them, supposedly to meet the new leader, 
Alfonso Cano. This ultimately resulted in Cesar’s capture 
and the hostages’ release. It is evident that Cesar trusted 
that he was facilitating the hostages’ transfer to another 
location, and that he was going to be transported to meet 
the new FARC commander.  This can be expressed as: Cesar 
trusted the NGO to (1) transport the hostages to another 
location and (2) transport him and his fellow FARC rebel to 
meet the new leader. The story met with Cesar’s 
expectations, partly because it was crafted to be similar to 
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past experiences with hostage transfers, and also because of 
important situational details that supported the main story.   
3. Discussion of Expectations  
Sztompka mentions three types of expectations that 
trust is based upon:  Instrumental, axiological and 
fiduciary (1999).  It is difficult to make many assumptions 
about expectations, especially in an operation that recently 
occurred, all of the details of which are yet to be fully 
known. We can assume, however, that Cesar based his trust, 
and actions, on certain expectations, which were most likely 
instrumental and axiological.  
Why did Cesar trust that he was communicating with the 
supreme leader of the secretariat, and that the hostage 
transfer was not a ruse?  Viecco and Camp (2008) note that 
the employment of a targeted man-in-the-middle attack and 
familiar techniques from “spear fishing”—“controlling 
context, personalizing the false messages and communicating 
a sense of urgency”- made the deception effective (p. 75).  
Since early 2008, the FARC had been using human envoys, a 
less secure communication channel, as communication 
transports between the secretariat and regional leaders 
(Viecco & Camp, 2008). Delivered voice recordings were used 
to maintain integrity. The Colombian military had already 
infiltrated the human envoys and was able to use information 
gleaned from confiscated FARC laptops to create plausible 
messages using a professional voice actor to imitate the new 
FARC supreme leader’s voice (Viecco & Camp, 2008). 
Additionally, the Colombian military prevented Cesar from 
communicating with his direct superior, Mono Jojoy, in order 
to prevent his validation of the orders from a third party—
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essentially a Denial of Service attack (Viecco & Camp, 
2008).  Other cues to manipulate the context were used to 
make the communication seem more trustworthy and will be 
discussed later.  The messages that Cesar received were 
likely consistent with previous messages and appeared   
reasonable, probably giving him no reason to doubt the 
truthfulness and authenticity.  
Cesar’s trust in the communications that he thought 
were from the new FARC leader may have been based on 
instrumental expectations of the leadership.  People 
generally have certain expectations of their leaders, such 
as regularity, reasonableness, credibility and/or 
efficiency.  Cesar would have been unlikely to trust orders 
from the leadership if they were irrational or chaotic. As 
Sztompka mentions, expectations of regularity are relatively 
safe, since most people will generally act regularly (1999).  
The trust placed in the NGO to transport the rebels and the 
hostages to meet Alfonso Cano was most likely based on 
instrumental expectations as well, and possibly axiological 
expectations such as moral responsibility, honorable 
conduct, truthfulness, and authenticity.  The use of what 
appeared to be a FARC-friendly NGO and FARC rebels met his 
expectations and did not raise his suspicions and distrust 
of the deception story. 
4. Grounds for Trust 
Sztompka (1999) writes,  
The persons or social objects (institutions, 
organizations, regimes) on which we consider 
conferring trust usually have been around for 
some time...We might already have been engaged 
with them earlier and therefore possess direct 
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experience of their meeting or breaching our 
trust... or we may have second-hand information 
about them, based on stories, testimonies, 
evaluations or credentials given by others. (p. 
71) 
A cue to trust can be based on past conduct of a 
similar nature or past cases of meeting trust, basically a 
record of consistent trustworthy behavior. This was not the 
first hostage transfer that had occurred, so there were 
observations or memories of past behavior.  This may explain 
why using similar helicopters, clothing and procedures were 
so important. The messages that Cesar received from what he 
perceived as the FARC’s new supreme leader in the highest 
ruling body, also used reputation as a cue to establish 
trust. Additionally, a fictitious NGO, International 
Humanitarian Mission, was created by the Columbian military 
to accomplish the rescue mission.  They used information 
from a real NGO for the website, which added credibility. 
Presenting an appearance of being a rebel-friendly 
relief agency that would transport the hostages to another 
location was critical to the success of the operation. 
Personality, identity and status were conveyed in such a 
manner that Cesar trusted the NGO enough to not only hand 
over the hostages, but to board the helicopter himself.  
Sztompka notes that several appearance factors “exude 
trustworthiness” and others look suspicious (1999).  The 
appearance of the actors in this deception was meticulously 
planned, down to the Che Guevara T-shirts that the “rebels” 
wore to make the organization and story more plausible.   
 The ploy utilized Russian-made helicopters, which were 
painted with white and red markings, similar to helicopters 
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used in other similar operations in the past, specifically a 
hostage release by Venezuela in January (Luhnow, 2008a).  
Additionally, the deception used a team of Columbian 
Military commandoes who played the roles of rebels, leftist 
NGO sympathizers and news crew.  One of the external 
characteristics that Sztompka mentions as providing a 
central cue to trust, indicating underlying personality, 
identity and status, is dress (1999).  Two of the undercover 
soldiers were dressed as television news crew; wearing red 
shirts and black vests usually worn by reporters from 
Chavez’s Telesur network, who have been along on previous 
hostage releases  (Luhnow, 2008a).  Two of the undercover 
officers had the appearance of being FARC rebels. One 
undercover officer appeared to be an Australian leftist. 
Additionally, when the helicopter landed, “undercover 
military agents dressed in Che Guevara T-shirts and 
appearing to be leftist sympathizers of the rebels, 
descended from the helicopter and warmly greeted the rebels 
holding the hostages” (Luhnow, 2008a). 
 Former FARC guerillas working for the Columbian 
military coached the soldiers playing guerrillas on how to 
walk and talk, so they would be credible rebels (Luhnow, 
2008a). Dialog similar to that from previous hostage 
transfers was used. An unkempt appearance was also key, 
which was cultivated by the undercover officers (Luhnow, 
2008a).  Sztompka (1999) mentions another important cue to 
trust is “body discipline, control of the body... 
cleanliness, and neatness” (p. 79).  This is because people 
generally trust those who show such a control, but in this 
case, Cesar would be more likely to trust people similar to 
him.  Sztompka (1999) writes: 
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Which features of appearance and demeanor are 
taken as signals of trustworthiness, and which 
evoke suspicion, is always relative to the 
trustor, as well as the context in which the 
evaluation takes place...(p. 80)   
People tend to trust those similar to themselves, as 
the inability to predict the future conduct of those who are 
different results in uncertainty and suspicion (Sztompka, 
1999). The unkempt appearance therefore increased 
trustworthiness. 
 The hostages were also handcuffed and told they were 
being taken to a very important person in the FARC, and were 
“treated brusquely” (Luhnow, 2008b). Besides the safety 
concerns, this was to give the appearance that this was 
indeed a hostage transfer and not a rescue attempt. 
Sztompka (1999) writes, “the trustworthiness of various 
objects of trust may be due not only to their immanent 
qualities...but also to some features of the external 
context in which their actions take place” (pp. 86-87).  Two 
of these factors, accountability and situational 
facilitation of trust may have contributed to the success of 
this deception. 
An NGO commonly refers to a “legally constituted 
organization created by natural or legal persons with no 
participation or representation of any government” (“Non-
governmental organization,” 2009).  An NGO’s neutrality 
allows it to interact with groups that would be difficult to 
interact with using other methods.  NGOs are frequently 
trusted more than government organizations or companies, 
because of their neutrality. In order to maintain its 
reputation and neutrality, however, an NGO should not 
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violate trust, and faces the threat of formal and/or 
informal sanctions should a breach of trust occur.  This 
enforcement of trustworthiness is accountability (Sztompka, 
1999).  The use of a fake NGO in this deception may have 
encouraged the regional leader to trust, but it is also 
likely that this ruse was successful because the rebels 
believed the NGOs were sympathetic to their cause, or 
because it was a similar scenario to the handover of 
hostages to Chavez in 2007.  There is not adequate evidence 
to say that accountability played a role in enhancing 
trustworthiness.  However, using fake NGOs in deceptions may 
lead to a loss of trustworthiness in NGOs, and may hinder 
future opportunities for operations such as this. 
 The character of the situation, or context, also plays 
a part in whether a deception target trusts or becomes 
suspicious.  This hostage transfer was to take place amongst 
recent pushes for humanitarian exchanges. The FARC has 
pushed for these exchanges due to its decreasing military 
success, but several presidents such as Chavez and Sarkozy 
have been involved in these negotiations due to the 
political benefits (Viecco & Camp, 2008). Additionally the 
communications were made to appear more trustworthy by the 
leaking of fake news from the Colombian government about a 
meeting with some European countries to discuss a possible 
‘humanitarian exchange’ (Viecco & Camp, 2008).  
A few days before the operation, two delegates 
from the European Union came to ask the Colombian 
government for permission to speak to the FARC 
precisely to start negotiating more hostage 
releases. The Colombian government gave them 




which helped reinforce the impression to the 
rebels holding the hostages that the story about 
Mr. Cano was right. (Luhnow, 2008a) 
Two other grounds for trust, trusting impulse and trust 
culture, can also play a role in the granting of trust 
(Sztompka, 1999).  In this case study, there is not enough 
information to make judgments about the trusting impulse of 
the deception target. It is similarly difficult to make 
judgments about trust culture. These two grounds for trust 
should be taken into account when planning a deception.  If 
a deception target has consistently had trust breached, it 
could result in the incapacity to trust.  Sztompka (1999) 
writes, “the trusting impulse becomes replaced with inherent 
suspiciousness, obsessive distrust, and alternative 
pathological developments in the social realm of juvenile 
gangs, organized crime, the Mafia, and so forth” (p. 99). 
Similarly, a culture’s experiences with trust or distrust 
may play a large role in whether trust or suspicion is 
prevalent in the society (Sztompka, 1999).  Both of these 
factors will influence the ability to create and exploit 
trust, and the susceptibility to deception. 
5. Implications of Exploited Trust 
The deception story in this case study not only met the 
FARC regional leader, Cesar’s expectations, it also provided 
him with various clues of trustworthiness to base his trust 
on. Appearance, reputation, qualities of the situation 
itself, and possibly accountability, made the bet of trust 
less risky. Because of the credibility and plausibility of 
the story, the deception was a success. The 
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success of this operation may have future implications for 
the FARC organization, as well as for other deceptions of 
this type.  
Already, the FARC had been weakened by the death of 
several top leaders and the defection of thousands of rebels 
(Luhnow, 2008a). The capture of laptops from a FARC camp in 
Ecuador earlier in the year, the infiltration of Columbian 
Military into the organization as well as the isolation of 
their fronts contributed to this operation.  This deception 
may further exacerbate the fragmentation and may cause 
distrust and questioning of orders from FARC leaders.   
A high-ranking officer in the Colombian Army said the 
successful rescue operation could be a "tipping point" for 
the FARC, which recently has lost three top leaders and 
hundreds of rebels who have defected and are providing the 
Colombian military valuable information about the group's 
inner workings (Luhnow, 2008a). "It's a brutal psychological 
hit," says the officer, who also believes the hostage rescue 
“will lead to mutual recrimination among the rebels and 
sharpen rivalries between top FARC commanders, leading to 
further desertions” (Luhnow, 2008a). 
B. OPERATION MINCEMEAT, 1943 
1. The Deception 
Operation Mincemeat refers to a successful British 
World War II deception, part of a larger plan named Barclay, 
to convince the German high command that the Allies planned 
to invade the Balkans rather than Sicily following the North 
African Campaign of 1943 (Latimer, 2001, p. 94). Operation 
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Mincemeat is known by many as one of the most successful 
deception operations of World War II. Despite the meticulous 
planning and focus on details, the success of Operation 
Mincemeat ultimately depended on the deception story 
confirming the target’s expectations and predispositions.   
As he approved Operation Mincemeat, Winston Churchill 
remarked, “Everyone but a bloody fool would know it was 
Sicily” (Montagu, 2001, p. 7), referring to the obvious 
target.  However, even two weeks after the landing in Sicily 
occurred, Hitler still remained convinced that the main 
assault would be in Greece (Montagu, 2001). This successful 
deception was due to an elaborate ruse to convince the 
Germans that they had intercepted "top secret" documents 
giving details of Allied war plans. The documents were 
attached to a corpse deliberately left to wash up on a beach 
in Spain. Also contributing to the deception was the 
inflation of British numbers, both Army and shipping, due to 
the exaggeration of reports by double agents that had been 
going on for years  (Montagu, 2001, p. 7).  The deception 
story of capturing Sardinia first and then Sicily from the 
North, and even a possible simultaneous Balkan invasion, was 
therefore plausible.  
The plan involved persuading the Germans that they had 
intercepted a top-level personal letter that alluded to 
Allied war plans (Montagu, 1977, p. 144). This letter would 
be attached to a dead body dressed as an officer, which 
would wash ashore in Spain. The objective of this deception 
was to support Operation Barclay, which had four main 
objectives:  to weaken Germany’s defense of Sicily, pin down 
German troops in France and the Balkans, reduce enemy 
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attacks on Allied ships as they prepared for the assault on 
Sicily, and “secure the greatest surprise” for the assault 
(Montagu, 2001, pp. 7-8). 
The next section will focus on the expectations, cues 
and/or predilections that may have played a role in the 
success of this operation. 
2. Targets of Trust  
Examining this deception from a trust perspective seems 
a little more difficult, since the targets of the Germans’ 
trust may not be as obvious.  There are several candidates: 
Allied forces, the corpse that washed up on shore, the 
General who allegedly penned the letter, German intelligence 
agents and communication channels. This paper proposes that 
the primary object of trust was the Allied Forces.  The 
Germans could either trust that the Allied forces would 
attack Sicily after the Campaign in North Africa or they 
could trust that the Allied Forces would attack somewhere 
else.  Either way, they would have made a bet that incurred 
some risk. They bet and trusted that the Allied Forces would 
attack elsewhere, basically trusting the story that they 
were presented with. All of the elements of the Mincemeat 
deception plan aimed to create trust in the deception story. 
There were several cues that led to the German’s bet of 
trust.  Hitler would not have simply believed the Allied 
Forces had they told him Sicily was not the objective.  This 
had to be deduced by German Intelligence and confirm what he 
already knew or expected for it to be credible. In order for 
Hitler to trust that the Allies had their sights on Sardinia 
or Greece rather than Sicily, second-hand cues would be 
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essential. Sztompka (1999) mentions another category of 
objects, “...there is also an important category of objects 
to be called the secondary objects of trust, which become 
the targets only derivatively, in the process of placing and 
justifying trust toward primary objects” (p. 46).  Second-
hand cues may include testimonies of experts, witnesses, 
sources, or authorities “referring to the credibility, or 
trustworthiness of the objects on which we consider placing 
our primary trust” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 46).  Some of the 
secondary targets of trust of the Germans included their 
agents, intelligence channels, and the coroner who examined 
the corpse.  
The Germans could not trust the Allies or the 
information planted on the washed up body without secondary 
cues.  Additionally, this trust was based on expectations, 
which will be addressed in the next section.   
3. Expectations and Grounds for Trust  
As mentioned earlier, in order for a deception to be 
successful, it must reinforce enemy expectations.  Trust 
based on the expectation that the Allied forces will act 
with regularity (for example: consistency, orderliness or 
continuity) is reasonable.  A degree of efficiency and 
competence can also be expected.  Instrumental expectations 
are basically expectations of rational behavior, and in a 
misleading deception it would be difficult to encourage the 
adversary to trust in an irrational target. This deception 
story reinforced enemy expectations because it made sense 
that Churchill would want to attack the Balkans.  The plan 
was consistent with Churchill’s references to the “soft 
underbelly of Europe” and Sardinia was a plausible target, 
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since it avoided fortified Sicily and left several options 
available (Montagu, 2001). The story also reinforced 
Hitler’s fears of an attack in the Balkans. The inclusion of 
details about Sicily being a cover target was also 
reasonable and consistent (Montagu, 1977). The information 
conveyed in the Allied letters was consistent with what the 
Germans might expect the letters to contain.  The deception 
planners gave just enough information for the Germans to 
come to the conclusion that the Allies would land in 
Sardinia and use Sicily as a cover. 
As discussed previously, Sztompka examines three 
foundations of trust—relational, psychological, and 
cultural—that determine the bets of trust that people make 
(1999). The Allied deception planners aimed to make the 
Germans trust the deception story, and therefore needed to 
establish its trustworthiness. Operation Mincemeat required 
that the document containing the information be so 
convincing that the Germans would act upon it by directing 
their efforts away from Sicily.  Authenticity was of 
paramount importance (Montagu, 2001). The success of 
Mincemeat relied on the creation of a persona—the appearance 
and reputation of which had to corroborate the deception 
story and the German decision maker’s expectations. 
The approved plan was that a corpse would be set adrift 
from a submarine off the coat of Huelva, Spain.  The body 
would have a briefcase containing important papers attached 
to it. Huelva was chosen because it was relatively certain 
that the papers or important documents would be turned over 
to a “Very active German agent...who had excellent contacts 
with certain Spaniards” (Montagu, 2001, p. 32).  The papers 
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contained in the briefcase were to convince the Germans that 
the Allies would attack Sardinia and Greece—not Sicily. The 
plan required that the Germans trust the information 
contained in the letter, and that required that they be able 
to verify the ‘authenticity’ of the man’s persona as well as 
believing that he would be carrying such a high-level letter 
(Montagu, 1977). A great effort was made to find a body that 
would have the appearance of being a victim of an aircraft 
crash at sea.  The planners sought the confidential advice 
of a pathologist who advised them on the type of body that 
would appear consistent with the story.  A body that was 
found in a “Mae West” life preserver could have died from 
any of a number of causes—including drowning, exposure, or 
shock (Montagu, 2001).  A body was found that had a suitable 
appearance and would pass for someone who died while 
floating at sea (Montagu, 2001). 
Major William Martin was chosen as the identity of the 
man who would wash ashore.  The name was chosen because 
there were several officers with that name who were of 
similar seniority for his age on the current Navy lists 
(Montagu, 1977, p. 148). The man was in his early 30s, and 
it was decided that he should be a staff officer in the 
Royal Marines. This would explain his less than excellent 
physical condition, as well as make it easier to find him a 
uniform (Montagu, 2001). Major Martin was Catholic, as 
indicated on his dog tag, by a cross on his neck, and a St. 
Christopher plaque in his wallet—this would also help ensure 
that the Spaniards not perform an autopsy (“Operation 
Mincemeat,” 2005). To give the appearance of authenticity, 
he had a briefcase chained to his wrist, which contained 
confidential papers, a wallet, an overdraft from his bank, 
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ticket stub from a play, a bill for a recent purchase of an 
engagement ring, personal letters, and a photo of his 
fiancée (Craig, 2005, p. 104). The planners went to great 
lengths to make Major Martin seem human, and included 
character flaws such as a replacement ID card and 
replacement HQ pass, letters from his father and an 
overdraft, all to reinforce the image that even though he 
was a responsible officer, he was a bit careless in his own 
affairs (“Operation Mincemeat,” 2005). All of these details 
were to appear consistent with expectations of what a young 
Royal Marine would be like and what he would be carrying 
with him.   
The reputation of the originator of the letter had to 
be established in order for the story to be credible. 
Montagu (2001) writes,  
...If the purpose of this document was to deceive 
the Germans so that they would act upon it, then 
it had to be on a really high level; no 
indiscretion or “leak” from an officer of normal 
rank would do.  Even a security lapse from one 
brigadier, air commodore or rear admiral to 
another would be weighty enough. (p. 43) 
The Germans had to be convinced that the officers 
concerned would know with certainty Allied plans, and were 
not themselves victims of a cover plan (Montagu, 2001).  
Montagu writes, “If the operation was to be worthwhile, I 
had to have a document written by someone, and to someone, 
whom the Germans knew—and whom they knew to be “right in the 
know” (Montagu, 2001, p. 43). Establishing reputation was 
essential. It was decided that the letter should be from 
General Sir Archibald Nye, the Vice-Chief of Imperial 
General Staff, to General Alexander at 18th Army Group 
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Headquarters.  Additionally, Major Martin had to have a 
certain reputation that would justify him carrying a letter 
of such importance. Montagu took care of that with a letter.  
The letter was from Lord Louis Mountbatten to Admiral Sir 
Andrew Cunningham, and made clear that he was a trustworthy 
officer who was selected to carry the important letter for 
General Alexander (Montagu, 2001).  It emphasized that it 
was an urgent and sensitive matter, and that Major Martin 
was a competent, intelligent officer (Montagu, 2001).   
Aside from the details of Major Martin’s identity and 
the letters that he carried, there were other details about 
the situation that served as additional indicators or cues 
of trustworthiness. These details included the location in 
which the body was planned to wash ashore. The planners had 
chosen Huelva, Spain, because they knew that Spain was 
thoroughly penetrated by the Germans, and that any papers 
that were found on the body would end up in the hands of the 
Germans (Montagu, 2001, p. 33).  
There is a significant amount written about Hitler’s 
childhood and youth, which helps to explain his trusting 
impulse, or lack thereof.  Redlich (1998) notes that Hitler 
felt that his father did not love him and his mother did not 
love him enough, despite his love for his mother.  Redlich 
writes, 
According to Erikson, security and faith in later 
life are based on a trustful relationship with 
the parents, and particularly with the mother. In 
my opinion Hitler did not trust his mother nor 
any women, and always remained a mistrustful 
person. (p. 257) 
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The problems between Hitler and his brother and their 
father increased in Hitler’s adolescence.  He did poorly in 
school and suffered from a lack of confidence and depression 
in his early adulthood. However, he eventually transformed 
himself into a charismatic politician (Redlich, 1998).  In 
his book Hitler:  Diagnosis of a Destructive Prophet, 
Redlich describes Hitler as a “destructive and paranoid 
prophet” who suffered from political paranoia (Redlich, 
1998, p. 335).   
Trust culture also plays a part in determining how 
trusting or suspicious individuals are (Sztompka, 1999).  
The years leading up to World War II were difficult times in 
Germany, having been humiliated in defeat during the First 
World War and believing they had been betrayed.  
Disillusionment and distrust contributed to the rise of 
Nazism and Nihilism (“World War I,” 2009).  There was little 
trust in government. Hitler eventually gained full power, 
establishing a totalitarian state and restructuring 
industry. A rise in tensions in 1939 from growing 
nationalism, militarism and territorial issues led to World 
War II (“Germany,” 2009).  Germany’s experience in World War 
I affected its attitudes and actions during World War II.  
Steinert (1977) notes,  
During the course of the war, comparisons were 
made again and again, both by political leaders 
and the public, to the time of the First World 
War...the Nazi elites tried its utmost to prevent 
a repeat of the so-called stab-in-the-back...the 
legend...that the homeland had undermined the 
front. (p. 2) 
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To what extent these factors affected Hitler’s decision 
to trust the deception story is unclear. It seems that this 
would make him suspicious in general, but the deception 
story and clues confirmed his expectations, which was most 
likely more important to the success of the operation. 
4. Trust Exploited 
On D-Day, July 10, 1943, Allied troops met with little 
resistance when landing at Sicily. Operation Mincemeat was 
such a success that even two weeks after Operation Husky’s 
D-Day, Hitler still believed that the main assault would be 
in Greece (Montagu, 2001). It was clear that the Germans had 
switched their focus and efforts from the south of Sicily to 
the western and northern portions that would have been 
threatened if the Allied Forces were either conducting a 
diversionary or secondary attack on Sicily (Montagu, 2001, 
p. 126). It seemed that the German’s had trusted the message 
and deception story. 
Later, evidence of the German Intelligence Service’s 
reaction to the documents was received. A “most secret” 
document by German Intelligence that was attached to the 
copy of the Sir Archibald Nye letter indicated that Admiral 
Doenitz had read it (Montagu, 2001, p. 129).  The document 
indicated that they believed the documents were “above 
suspicion,” that they believed the deception story, and also 
revealed the fact that the Germans carefully studied “every 
word and implication” of the letter (Montagu, 2001, p. 132). 
Montagu (2001) writes, “it fully justified the care 
with which we had built up the personality of Major Martin, 
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so that the very “reality” of that officer carried 
conviction as to the genuineness of the documents that he 
was carrying...”(p. 134).   
5. Implications of Deception 
This deception shows that it is possible to cause an 
adversary to place trust in a deception story if the 
target’s expectations are considered and trustworthy cues 
are provided. The planting of information via false 
documents was nothing new—other deceptions had utilized this 
method in the past.  The successful “Haversack” ruse in 
World War I is one example.  Germany had also found 
documents on a body that had floated ashore from a plane 
crash in 1942 and discounted them as bogus, even though the 
information about the upcoming Operation Torch was in fact 
true and not a deception (“Operation Mincemeat,” 2009).  The 
fact that they had discounted important documents before may 
have made them more likely to trust the Mincemeat documents.  
There are surely limits to how many times a ruse can be used 
successfully, however. 
One possible result of deception is that the deceived 
may have a greater alertness to being deceived again, and 
will be less trusting of received information.  This does 
not necessarily mean that there is less of a chance of being 
deceived. As a result of the British success of Operation 
Mincemeat, the Germans became excessively alert to the 




When the detailed plans of the impending landing 
in Normandy fell into their hands...they were 
convinced that this was yet another clever Allied 
deception; consequently, they refused to accept 
the detailed plan as authentic. (p. 144)  
C. BARBAROSSA, 1941 
1. The Deception 
Operation Barbarossa was the code name for Germany’s 
campaign to mislead Stalin and achieve surprise upon the 
invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II. The 
operation commenced on June 22, 1941, when 4.5 million Axis 
troops invaded Russia on an 1800-mile front (“Operation 
Barbarossa,” 2009). It is notable that despite a large 
amount of accurate Soviet intelligence regarding troop 
movements and fortifications that should have made Hitler’s 
intent obvious, and intelligence from other Allied sources, 
Stalin refused to take decisive actions to prepare for the 
German invasion.    
Germany was able to accomplish this “M-type” deception 
by disguising its build-up on the Russian border as an 
exercise linked to the invasion of Britain (Daniel & Herbig, 
1982, p. 158). An important reason that the German deceivers 
were able to achieve surprise was that Barbarossa took 
advantage of Stalin’s expectations and preconceived notions, 
specifically Stalin’s expectation that Germany would not 
attack under the current circumstances. Two circumstances, 
not planned deceptions, contributed to Barbarossa: the 
Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and the War with 
Britain and related events in the West (Stolfi, 1982, p. 
196).   
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This case study will examine why Stalin trusted the 
Germans and their deception story when intelligence and 
evidence existed showing the German buildup and intentions 
in the East.  
2. Stalin’s Expectations 
The German deception campaign that lasted from July 31, 
1940, until June 22, 1941, consisted of four mutually 
supporting themes that were well planned to fit the Russians 
preconceptions and “achieved almost complete believability 
within the intelligence services of Russia” (Whaley, 2002, 
p. 81). 
Stalin’s expectations and preconceptions of Germany’s 
behavior led to their misplacement of trust and ultimate 
deception. These included instrumental and possibly 
axiological expectations that facilitated the bet that 
Germany would not attack yet. His expectations were so 
strong that Germany did not have to do much in terms of 
deception—Stalin practically deceived himself.   
Sztompka (1999) notes that expectations of regularity 
(orderliness, consistency, coherence, continuity, and 
persistence) are “rather safe, because the probability that 
most agents will behave regularly, rather than randomly and 
chaotically, is relatively high” (p. 53). Conclusions have 
been made that Stalin expected that the Germans would not 
attack in 1941, and that “any German build-up would be part 
of a familiar pattern of demands and provocation that the 
Soviets would recognize and could parry at least until 1941” 
(Stolfi, 1982, p. 201).  This suggests that Stalin had 
certain instrumental expectations of Hitler, that his 
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behavior would be consistent with past behavior.  This was 
due to the 1939 Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact, which the 
Soviets firmly adhered (Stolfi, 1982, p. 201).  There had 
been a few events that stressed the Pact, but Germany had 
given credible explanations for the Polish Campaign, 
occupation of Bulgaria and war in the Balkans (Stolfi, 1982, 
p. 201).  Germany and Russia held high-level meetings and 
subsequently negotiated two trade agreements in November 
1940 in an “outwardly effective show of cooperation and 
friendship” (Stolfi, 1982, p. 201).  Stolfi (1982) also 
mentions, “such harmony would contribute to the genuine 
surprise widely expressed by the civilian populations of 
both Germany and Russia over the attack” (p. 202).   
It seemed that the bet of trust that the Soviets would 
not attack in 1941 was also based on the expectation that 
Germany would have their hands quite full in the west.  
Stalin’s biographer General Volkogonov wrote, 
Britain’s continued resistance made it possible 
for Stalin to hew to the consistent line that 
Hitler would never turn against Russia until he 
had vanquished the British and that Hitler would 
never repeat the error of the first World War and 
entrap Germany in a two-front war. (as cited in 
Barros and Gregor, 1995, p. 9)   
Andrei Zhdanov, a member of the Politburo of the 
Party’s central committee also noted that with Germany 
involved with Britain, the Russians were able to do what 
they wanted (Barros & Gregor, 1995).  Kuznetsov (1969) notes 
that Zhdanov thought that World War I was evidence of 




Bismarck’s famous comment that Germany should never sever 
its contacts with Russia” (as cited in Barros & Gregor, 
1995, p. 9). 
3. Grounds for Trust 
Reputation and performance are both grounds for 
granting trust, as they give some indication of the degree 
of trustworthiness of the trustee (Sztompka, 1999).  
Indicators of reputation and performance likely contributed 
to increasing Stalin’s trust in Hitler and his suspicion of 
Britain and France. Sztompka notes, “The knowledge relevant 
for our decision to trust depends on the type of trust being 
considered” (p. 71). It may refer to past conduct of a 
similar nature, past cases of meeting trust or past 
occasions of returning trust (Sztompka, 1999). Past and 
current experience with Germany and the Allies affected 
Russia’s trust decisions. In this case, Hitler’s conduct 
with regard to maintenance of economic and diplomatic ties 
was an important factor in assuaging Russian suspicions 
(Whaley, 2002, p. 84).  Some of the efforts included the 
continued commercial negotiations and deliveries of 
strategic goods, weapons and military-industrial 
manufactures and negotiations of frontiers that began with 
the Russo-German Pact of 1939 (Whaley, 2002).  Murphy (2005) 
writes that “Hitler appears to have personally reassured 
Stalin that Great Britain, not the Soviet Union, was 
Germany’s principal enemy” (p. 248) and that the troops on 
the Eastern front were there to protect them from Britain 
and prepare for an invasion of Britain.  The letters include 
Hitler’s assurance; “on (his) honor as chief of state” that 
Germany would not invade (Murphy, 2005, p. 258).  Germany’s 
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reputation based on recent conduct with the Soviet Union and 
its current performance likely contributed to Stalin’s 
decision to trust.  Stalin was convinced that the Capitalist 
states of Britain and France would never help the Communist 
Soviet Union to maintain peace, but rather would “connive to 
ensure Hitler would turn eastward...even going so far as to 
join Hitler in an attack on the USSR” (Murphy, 2005, p. 
xvii).  The 1938 Sudeten Crisis, the inability to come to an 
agreement with Britain and France, and the lack of support 
for a two-pronged attack on Germany added to the distrust of 
the Allied forces. Stalin chose to trust Hitler rather than 
Churchill and Roosevelt when they tried to warn him. The 
warnings only served to confirm his beliefs of a conspiracy 
(Murphy, 2005).  The reputations and performance of both 
Germany and the Allied Forces must be considered. 
Agents of accountability serve as enforcers of 
trustworthiness, because they monitor or sanction the 
trustee (Sztompka, 1999); they add an incentive for the 
trustee to live up to the expectations of the trustor. 
Hardin (1991) notes, “you can more confidently trust me if 
you know that my own interest will induce me to live up to 
your expectations” (as cited in Sztompka, 1999, p. 88).  
Additionally, pre-commitment is a special type of 
accountability that can strengthen the estimation of 
trustworthiness.  Pre-commitment involves a trustee who 
sacrifices certain freedoms or actions to increase their 
trustworthiness (Sztompka, 1999).  Stalin signed a 10-year 
agreement with Germany on August 24, 1939, shortly after 
tripartite discussions between Russia, Britain and France 
broke down. Stated provisions of the pact included agreement 
not to attack the other, neutrality in the event of an 
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attack by another power, consultation, arbitration of 
differences between parties, and no membership of a group of 
powers aimed against the other (“German-Soviet Nonaggression 
Pact,” 2009). The pact also included “secret protocols” that 
were later revealed. There are several theories about the 
reasons that Stalin entered into the pact, one of which was 
that Stalin entered into the pact because Russia was not 
prepared to fight a war in 1939 and needed “immunity from 
German attack” (Carr, 1952 as cited in “Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact,” 2009).  It was also beneficial to Hitler, as he could 
focus on the West without the threat of war with Russia.  
Such a pact can be considered a type of pre-commitment, 
since both parties limit their freedom of action and are 
bound to certain terms of the agreement. This type of 
arrangement makes the partners more trustworthy, and 
decreases the risks of trusting.  Without someone to hold 
parties accountable, however, a pact may be worthless.  
Perhaps the biggest situational facilitation of trust 
that is evidenced is the war in the West.  Stolfi (1982) 
writes, “working within the favorable deceptive 
circumstances of friendly relations with the Soviet Union 
and a noisily active war with another major power...the 
Germans executed effective active and passive 
deception...”(p. 217). The plan for the invasion of Britain 
in 1941, Operation Sea Lion, while initially a plan to 
invade Britain became a grand deception for the attack of 
the Soviet Union (Stolfi, 1982, p. 197).  In addition to the 
war in the west, the buildup and major offensives against 




provided a cover story for Barbarossa, as it reduced the 
probability of a German attack against Russia in the summer 
of 1941 (Stolfi, 1982, p. 198; Whaley, 2002, p. 83).    
In addition to clues of trustworthiness relating to 
reputation, performance, agents of accountability and 
situational factors, clues relating to trust culture and the 
trusting impulse may also be useful in this analysis.  The 
period of time leading up to the Second World War was a 
difficult time in the Soviet Union.  Stalin gained control 
of the Communist Party and received much criticism for his 
industrial policies and the widespread famine attributed to 
his agricultural policies (Murphy, 2005).  As a result, he 
eliminated opposition through a series of purges, arresting 
and executing some of the most talented and experienced 
Soviets (Murphy, 2005). This caused a widespread atmosphere 
of fear and suspicion.  The problems in Russia were 
occurring during a time when Germany was rearming and 
beginning to take actions to expand its territory, to 
include taking Czechoslovakia.  Murphy (2005) writes, 
Stalin...must certainly have known, after his 
rebuff in Czechoslovakia at the hands of the 
British and French, that he could expect little 
help from them were he to oppose a German 
invasion of Poland.  Consequently, he would drive 
the best bargain he could with Hitler. (p. 6)  
These events led to the 1939 Russo-German Non-
Aggression Pact, and might explain why Stalin came to trust 
Hitler more than he would the Allies. 
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4. Stalin’s Suspicions 
Michael Handel (1982) notes that Stalin may have 
deceived himself by believing deception was behind many acts 
when, in fact, it was not (p. 139). Handel writes:  
The Soviet’s communist ideology assumes that the 
capitalists will always try to deceive and that 
therefore they should never be trusted in the 
first place...Thus when Churchill and the British 
warned him on the basis of knowledge acquired by 
Ultra of impending German attack in 1941, he 
refused to believe them and viewed this 
information as an attempt to drag the Soviet 
Union into a war against Germany in order to ease 
the pressure in the West. (p. 139)   
D. FBI INFILTRATION OF THE KKK 
1. The Deception 
COINTELPRO, or Counter Intelligence Program, was the 
name given to a program of covert operations conducted by 
the FBI in the 1950s and 1960s, focusing on violent or 
subversive organizations in the United States (“Facts and 
Figures,” 2003).  FBI records show that approximately 15% of 
COINTELPRO resources were expended to marginalize and 
subvert "White Hate Groups" including the Ku Klux Klan and 
National States' Rights Party (Jeffreys-Jones, 2007).  
The disappearance of three civil rights workers in 
Mississippi in the summer of 1964, an example of the spread 
of Klan terror in the South, prompted the initiation of a 
large-scale investigation of the Klan activities (Davis, 
1992).  KKK violence in the South escalated during July, 
August and September. The KKK had grown to 14,000 members 
(Davis, 1992). During the same time period, the bodies of 
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the three civil rights workers were found. The directives 
governing COINTELPRO were issued by FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover in August 1964, who ordered FBI agents to expose, 
disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the 
Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups (Davis, 1992). In 
essence, war against the Klan was declared. 
The arsenal of techniques that the FBI used in this 
counter-intelligence program were similar to those used 
against other movements, such as the Communist Party U.S.A 
and the Socialist Workers Party, but this was the first time 
that they were used against “homegrown” targets—meaning 
there was no link between the White Hate targets and foreign 
or international groups (Davis, 1992). This program ran for 
seven years and is credited with the dramatic decline of the 
KKK, which by the end of the program in 1971 was down to 
4,300 members (Davis, 1992). There were over 289 
counterintelligence actions directed against primarily KKK 
targets, with known results from 139 (Davis, 1992).  Many of 
these actions aimed to draw members away from the 
organization, sow seeds of distrust and suspicion amongst 
the members, and to disrupt Klan activities.  The COINTELPRO 
did this in a variety of ways, some of which will be 
examined in more detail:  (1) propaganda campaigns; (2) 
false organizations established to draw people away from the 
Klan; and (3) infiltrations and the use of informants 
(Davis, 1992). 
The FBI was able to establish and exploit trust in the 




Through the use of informants, infiltration and by 
discrediting Klan members, they undermined trust in the 
organization, leading to its dramatic decline.   
2. Targets of Trust 
There are several trust relationships that can be seen 
in the FBI’s operations against the Klan.  There was a 
deception campaign in the form of propaganda and 
misinformation aimed at the families, associates and 
communities of Klan members as well as the Klan members 
themselves—the effectiveness of which relied on the 
credibility of the messages and sources used.  This required 
that the recipients trust the source and the content of the 
messages.  Even if the message was an anonymous letter, 
there had to be something about it that made the reader 
believe the content.  Another technique that was used was 
the creation of fictitious organizations.  In order for this 
deception tactic to accomplish the objective of drawing 
members away from the Klan, it had to cause the targeted 
members to trust the fictitious organization about their 
claims with regard to the KKK. For example, informants set 
up an entirely notional Klan that aimed to draw members away 
from the UKA; it eventually had a membership of 250 and was 
directed by the FBI (Davis, 1992).  Creating trust in the 
sources of information and in the false organizations 
resulted in a decrease of trust in the KKK organization 
itself.    
In addition to the targets of trust discussed above, 
another element of the FBI’s campaign against the KKK was to 
undermine trust in the organization itself.  This entailed 
breaking trust relationships. Members have certain 
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expectations of their fellow Klansmen that if violated can 
destroy trust.  Klansmen trust other members, particularly 
the Klan leaders, to uphold certain values—similar to other 
fraternal or oath-bound organizations that the Klan was 
modeled after. Attacking or questioning the values of a 
member is one way to fracture that trust.  Similarly, 
maintaining anonymity or secrecy is also valued, and members 
trust one another to maintain it.  The perception of 
informants or infiltrators can cause paranoia or suspicion, 
undermining and ultimately destroying trust. 
3. Trust Relative to Expectations  
All the techniques that the FBI brought to bear on the 
KKK had one objective—to undermine and discredit the Klan. 
Many of the tactics focused on the expectations of the 
Klansmen, both of their fellow Klansmen and the leaders. 
These expectations include less risky instrumental 
expectations, such as regularity, reasonableness, and 
expectations of efficiency. Trust in the organization was 
also based on riskier axiological expectations of moral 
responsibility, honorable conduct towards other members, and 
shared religious and patriotic values. Klansmen expected 
secrecy, and a certain standard of behavior, which is common 
in oath driven organizations. In fact, the oath requires 
members to pledge values such as secrecy, honor, patriotism, 
benevolence, fraternity and faithfulness, while also 
committing to racism and nativism (“Between the Wars,” 
1975). They also expected certain behavior from their 
leaders such as competence, proper performance, and 
responsible use of resources and dues. The oath implies that 
there are certain fiduciary expectations as well, such as 
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benevolence, disinterestedness, putting another’s interests 
first, and generosity. The expectations that are most 
evident are instrumental and axiological. The COINTELPRO 
took advantage of these expectations in their campaign 
against the Klan.   
The propaganda and disinformation campaigns relied on 
establishing credibility or trust in the messages that were 
sent.  One of the most effective mailings used was a simple 
postcard (Davis, 1992).  These postcards were sent 
anonymously to members’ residences and places of employment 
(Davis, 1992).  This campaign focused on members’ 
expectation of secrecy or anonymity.  This deception was 
effective and credible because it convinced the recipient 
that someone knew who he was.  The FBI’s mailing lists were 
compiled by membership lists from informants or information 
about rally attendees (Davis, 1992).  Agents reduced 
suspicion and possible distrust of the messages by the use 
of different typewriters, writing styles, and only sending a 
few at a time from different locations (Davis, 1992).  Many 
recipients trusted the message that they received, because 
if they received the cards it was evident someone knew who 
they were. Davis (1992) writes, “according to informants 
working within the local klaverns, a number of Klan members 
said they had received cards, and expressed concern that 
their privacy had been penetrated by someone they did not 
know” (p. 79).  These mailings also served to create 
distrust between members, since they often led to the 
suspicion of other Klan members. 
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Another technique the FBI used to draw members away 
from the Klan was the use of fictitious or notional 
organizations.  The bureau created a newsletter to be sent 
to klaverns where tensions existed, or where informants were 
likely to be recruited (Davis, 1992).  This newsletter 
appealed to the values of patriotism and religion of Klan 
members, and encouraged them to leave the Klan and join the 
(fictitious) ‘National Committee for Domestic Tranquility.’ 
The newsletters had a strong impact on the Klan (Davis, 
1992).  Again, the mailings of the newsletters to Klan 
members made them realize that their membership was not 
secret and caused membership to decline.  Some of these 
newsletters implicated corrupt leaders or communists in the 
organization and served to undermine the leadership (Vaughan 
& Drabble, 2006).   
One FBI communication to Klan members accused Klan 
leaders of being ‘confidence men’ and swindling dues and 
donations to fund their lifestyles (Vaughan & Drabble, 
2006).  Klansmen trust in their leaders was based partly on 
certain expectations of moral conduct, or axiological 
expectations, such as being morally responsible, honest, and 
following some general moral rules—not embezzling money.  
The FBI disseminated information regarding derogatory or 
embarrassing information (such as embezzlement or sexual 
immorality) to trusted contacts in the media and local 
governments (Vaughan & Drabble, 2006).  This exposed several 
Klan leaders such as United Klans of America Grand Dragon J. 
R. Jones and UKA Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton as “money 
makers,” “leaders of a tight knit dictatorship that holds no 
elections and tolerates no criticism from the ranks” 
(Vaughan & Drabble, 2006).  Mailings to Klansmen echoed 
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similar themes, stating ‘Klansman, which Klan leaders are 
spending your money tonight? Think!’ In addition to 
supplying information about these financial breaches of 
trust, other propaganda focused on sexual immorality, 
capitalizing on rumors circulating in the Klan of J. R. 
Jones extramarital affairs (Vaughan & Drabble, 2006). 
Propaganda also appealed to a shared anti-communist 
sentiment, likening leaders to ‘cowardly communists’ 
(Vaughan & Drabble, 2006).  Vaughan and Drabble (2006) 
write,  
Depending on whether the recipient of this 
cartoon had previously trusted their leaders or 
not, the cartoons either evoked or reinforced a 
sense of moral superiority vis-à-vis the 
leadership, and concerns about the authenticity 
of their credentials were either undermined or 
confirmed.   
Informants were used extensively in supplying 
information to the FBI for the purposes of the propaganda 
campaign.  As a result, the information in the messages was 
much more credible and trustworthy. Davis (1992) writes: 
“Former Klan informants now recall that they reported in 
everything imaginable concerning the klaverns and the 
individual KKK members” (p. 87).  The use of shared 
symbology, values, and language in cartoons and messages 
allowed FBI efforts to hit very close to home, creating 
trust in the messages and exploiting weaknesses in the 
organization.   
4. Grounds for Trust 
 In order to decide whether to confer trust, traits of 
the trustee (reflected trustworthiness), and the context the 
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trustee operates in (derived trustworthiness) must be 
considered (Sztompka, 1999).  As seen in the other cases 
studied, deceptions can manipulate these cues or traits to 
create trust. In the deception campaign that the FBI 
conducted against the KKK, these cues are seen to a certain 
extent, but the focus of this discussion will be on the 
methods that the FBI used to undermine these cues of 
trustworthiness amongst Klan members.   
 Primary trustworthiness of targets is based on 
reputation, performance, and appearance (Sztompka, 1999). 
The deceptions in this case manipulated cues such as 
reputation and appearance. Reputation as a ground for trust 
can be based on first-hand knowledge of an individual or 
organization, second-hand accounts or testimonies, or 
credentials based on trust granted by others (Sztompka, 
1999).  One clue to a person’s reputation is personal 
interaction with that person over a period of time. Another 
is membership in a selective group. Testimonies or 
credentials granted by credible organizations or persons 
also suggest trustworthiness.  Some of the deception 
techniques used interviews or informants to provide trusted, 
reliable news sources with information to discredit Klan 
leaders and members (Vaughan & Drabble, 2006). Using 
reputable sources to promulgate this disinformation aids in 
enhancing its trustworthiness. Several of the mailings used, 
including the NCDT newsletters and the letters to wives of 
Klansmen, appealed to people’s desire to maintain their 
reputation; others attempted to destroy and discredit the 
reputation of Klan leaders (Davis, 1992; Vaughan & Drabble, 
2006).  Since people in an organization frequently use 
reputation as an indicator of one’s trustworthiness, 
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manipulating reputation may be an effective way to create 
trust for exploitation or to destroy trust in an 
organization. 
 Appearance is another cue that is used to establish 
trustworthiness and was an important factor for a Klan 
member in determining whom to trust or distrust. Sztompka 
(1999) notes that people are more inclined to trust others 
who are similar to them and distrust those who are 
dissimilar. We are more likely to trust someone of a similar 
race, age or gender because their behavior is more 
predictable (Sztompka, 1999). This deception relied on 
infiltrators who had a similar, trustworthy appearance, and 
fictitious organizations such as the NCDT and the notional 
Klan that had the appearance of consisting of people just 
like them. Highlighting differences between people in an 
organization, in terms of who they are, what they possess, 
or their status, may cause rifts that can be exploited. 
 As mentioned earlier, there are three types of 
contextual conditions that are instrumental in establishing 
trustworthiness:  accountability of the trustees, pre-
commitment and trust-inducing situations (Sztompka, 1999).  
The KKK is an oath-driven organization, and as such has 
certain rules and sanctioning of Klan members’ conduct. 
Members must go through an initiation ceremony where they 
take an oath.  Klan members were held accountable to the 
leaders and also informally to their fellow Klansmen.  The 
conduct of Klan leaders was also monitored by other members 
of the Klan. Accountability to others in an organization 
encourages trustworthiness, mainly by the threat of censure 
and punishment (Sztompka, 1999).  Hence members of the Klan 
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who took a membership oath would seem trustworthy to other 
members. An infiltrator or an informant who appears to be 
under the same agreement or agent of accountability would 
also seem trustworthy. 
 Pre-commitment is sometimes present in initiation 
rituals of gangs and criminal organizations. Sztompka (1999) 
writes, “this raises their trustworthiness because first, it 
proves the seriousness of their aspirations to belong, and 
second...it changes their legal situation as guilty of 
crime” (p. 93). Klan members applied for membership, took an 
oath of membership during an initiation ceremony, and were 
required to pay initiation dues, building trustworthiness 
and strengthening their ties to the group.  By performing 
these same acts, infiltrators were able to establish 
trustworthiness as well. 
 The features of the setting or context also contribute 
to the decision to grant or withdraw trust.  Sztompka (1999) 
writes, “Trust is easier to come by in close-knit, small, 
intimate communities...” (p. 93) A fraternal organization, 
especially one where members are similar and have close 
bonds, relationships and goals, may encourage 
trustworthiness amongst members.   
 Finally, trust impulse and trust culture can serve as 
bases for trust. Hardin (1993) notes, “High capacity for 
trust is a by-product of fortunate experience” (as cited in 
Sztompka, 1999, p. 97).  If trust is frequently met, a 
trusting impulse is facilitated; if trust is frequently 
violated or breached, the trusting impulse may be 
suppressed, resulting in incapacity to trust (Sztompka, 
1999).  The resulting distrust and suspicion can lead to the 
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involvement in gangs and criminal organization (Sztompka, 
1999).  It cannot be said, however, that association with a 
certain organization or movement means that a member had 
unfortunate experiences with trust and lacks a trusting 
impulse. The KKK consisted of different people from 
different life experiences, some committed to acts of 
violence, and others who were law abiding citizens. Many 
were characterized as being uneducated or economically 
disadvantaged; many were average, working class men; and 
others were wealthy.  There is no evidence of a 
psychological trait or background common to members, and a 
generalization of trusting impulse cannot easily be made. 
 In The Ku Klux Klan, Sara Bullard writes, “the study of 
the ebb and flow of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States 
reveals a pattern: the Klan is strong when its leaders are 
able to capitalize in social tensions and the fears of white 
people...”(p. 24).  The Klan of the 1960s reflects the 
tensions and fears that arose out of the repeal of “separate 
but equal” and order for integration (Bullard, 1998). 
Sztompka (1999) makes the conclusion that “cultural 
roles...may play a powerful role in codetermining the degree 
to which trust or distrust prevail in a given society, at a 
certain historical moment” (p. 101). In the 1960s, many 
people were suspicious of the government and institutions, 
and interracial distrust was also evident.  These factors 
may have played a role in KKK members’ decisions of trust.   
5. Trust Exploited 
 The FBI was able to establish and exploit trust in the 
deception and propaganda campaign that they conducted 
against the Ku Klux Klan in the 1960s.  The Bureau was able 
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to take advantages of certain expectations and cues of 
trustworthiness to conduct a credible deception. Through the 
use of informants, infiltration, fictitious organizations, 
and propaganda discrediting Klan members, they also 
undermined trust in the organization leading to its dramatic 
decline.  Although COINTELPRO was terminated in 1971 after 
operations were exposed and has been criticized for its 
methods and targets, there are lessons to be learned from 
the successful neutralization of an organization such as the 
KKK.  Understanding expectations and trust in an 
organization is important in planning a deception operation 
such as this. 
 83
V. CONCLUSIONS 
While much has been written on both trust and 
deception, less has been written about the connection 
between the two.  Trust literature mentions that trust may 
leave one open to deception, that in the action of trusting, 
an individual incurs the risk of not having that trust met 
or of having that trust exploited. The impact of having 
trust consistently breached or exploited is also mentioned 
as Sztompka discusses individual and collective trust 
experiences that contribute to two grounds for trust: 
trusting impulse, and trust culture. Deception can also have 
serious consequences on future trust.  
Most deception literature refers to the targets’ 
beliefs, expectations and preconceived notions, and the 
necessity of the deception story to fit with them.  The 
definition of trust used in this paper—an expectation or 
belief followed by an action, or as Sztompka defines it: “a 
bet about the future contingent actions of others”—is 
precisely what a deception planner wants the target of a 
deception to do. In order for a target to believe the 
deception story and take the desired action required that 
the story match the target’s expectations. Most deception 
theorists mention this as a principle of deception.   
If trust leaves an individual vulnerable to deception, 
why wouldn’t a deception planner want to exploit that 
vulnerability?  It seems that in the vast amount of 
literature written on the theme of trust, deception is 
regarded as a bad thing.  In the literature on deception, 
however, it is recognized as a useful and powerful 
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capability.  Deception is a part of human nature.  It has 
been part of military strategy throughout history and has 
led to many successes and victories.  It stands to reason 
that we should seek to be better deceivers in some sense, 
and looking to topics such as trust may help. Exploring the 
reasons or factors behind the act of trusting may aid in 
understanding vulnerability to deception.  This may aid the 
deception planner in the development of a credible deception 
story that the deception target will trust.  Understanding 
the trust relationships within an organization can also aid 
in the deliberate undermining of that trust. 
Sztompka discusses expectations in terms of the risk of 
the bet made in each case.  One incurs more risk when 
betting on someone’s moral behavior, honesty or 
disinterestedness than when betting on their regularity, 
rationality or consistency.  If a deception planner is 
trying to encourage a deception target to place a bet, and 
take an action based on trust, it makes sense that he or she 
would focus on instrumental expectations. That is not to say 
that there are not opportunities to take advantage of 
axiological or fiduciary expectations. 
There are also certain clues that help people decide 
whether to trust and lessen the risk.  Sztompka identifies 
several.  Reflected trustworthiness, the most important 
ground for trust, involves using information to make an 
estimate of trustworthiness about the trustee. Sztompka 
writes, “Such knowledge may be true or false, right or 
wrong, correct or incorrect.  The probability of well-placed 
trust rises with the amount and variety of true information 
about the trustee. Without such knowledge, trust is blind 
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and the chances of breach of trust are high” (Sztompka, 
1999, p. 70). Certain characteristics of the external 
context or situation may also enhance trustworthiness, 
reducing the risk of the bet (Sztompka, 1999, p. 87). 
Finally, some people are inclined to trust or suspicion 
despite estimates of trustworthiness.  This may be because 
of individual experiences with trust or distrust, or the 
collective experiences of a culture. If a potential truster 
relies on these clues to lessen the risk of trusting, to 
decide whether to grant or withdraw trust, it stands to 
reason that a deception planner should focus on these 
dimensions—relational and psychological, in order to lessen 
the “risk” of a target trusting.   
While trust may make one susceptible to deception, and 
a target’s trust may be misplaced, it is not reasonable to 
think that this trust will be sustained. Despite examples 
throughout the history of deception where targets of 
deception saw only what they wanted to see, and looked only 
for ways to confirm their expectations, when presented with 
sufficient evidence, they realize that their expectations 
were not met. This explains things such as a person 
committing trust, having the trust betrayed and subsequently 
distrusting deceptive politicians.  This also explains the 
limited shelf life of many of the military deception plans. 
Deception can also damage credibility.  Handel (1982) 
writes: 
Those who frequently deceive quickly lose 
credibility; so what they can do one, two, or 
three times in succession they cannot do 
indefinitely...as a result they may find 
themselves in a position in which no state will 
voluntarily seek any agreements with them, and 
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they will force the deceived to be more alert, to 
have better intelligence, and eventually resort 
to similar means.  (p. 139)  
Nations or individuals that frequently deceive are not 
necessarily better at deception than those who do not 
routinely engage in deception. Handel (1982) makes the 
following observation:   
Paradoxically the ‘naïve’, trusting states may 
turn out to be much better at the game of 
deception. One explanation for this is very 
simple.  Someone who is known to be ‘naïve’ and 
honest will find it hard to lose his reputation 
and can therefore cheat and deceive much better 
when he wants (at least for awhile). (p. 139) 
 The naïve, honest individual or state is perhaps able 
to deceive better because they are more trustworthy—the 
truster may have positive expectations of them fulfilling 
trust, or they may have demonstrated trustworthiness through 
reputation.  Allied deception in World War II may be an 
example of this. Handel (1982) notes that this may explain 
why the British were able to deceive the Germans so easily—
the Germans had deceived the British many times in 
peacetime, so they would not believe that the British would 
be able to master the art of deception in war (p. 139). 
This paper’s objectives were to provide the reader with 
an overview of the topic of trust, examine various theories 
of deception in order to clarify the relevance of trust to 
deception operations, and examine various case studies from 
a trust perspective, particularly focusing on how exploiting 
or undermining trust may have played a role in the success 
of the deception.  Piotr Sztompka’s presents a valuable 
framework for looking at trust in the selected case studies 
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of deception, but it cannot be rigidly applied. The case 
studies show different ways that expectations were taken 
advantage of, or ways that grounds for trust were 
manipulated.  Most of the expectations that an individual 
would have of a potential deceiver would fall in the realm 
of instrumental expectations.  These bets of trust incur 
less risk.  It is riskier to expect one to act morally, 
honorably, or in the interests of another—but someone who 
possesses these expectations is more vulnerable to 
deception.  All of the reflected and derived grounds for 
trust are subject to manipulation—in the case studies the 
most commonly exploited were reputation and appearance, but 
Barbarossa shows that pre-commitment in the form of a Pact 
can deceive someone into trusting. There are challenges to 
manipulating these cues, however.  Sztompka (1999) notes 
that the primary cues require obtaining knowledge about the 
targets of trust and that this may be easier in certain 
situations such as close and intimate relationships, also 
lessening the possibility of deceit.  People must also 
detect and make use of the various cues for them to be 
effective (Sztompka, 1999).  Complexity can make it more 
difficult to estimate trustworthiness (Sztompka, 1999).   
The inclination to trust can also be a product of 
personal experiences with trust or of history.  The idea 
that a person will be more inclined to trust (or be 
suspicious) based on past experiences of trust being met or 
breached is an important concept that should be considered. 
Sztompka (1999) gives an account of how in Communist Poland, 
it was appropriate to trust people in the private domain but 
generally not in the public domain; but even in the public 
domain, some people were trusted more than others. For 
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instance, the Army was trusted more than the police and the 
parliament more that the communist party (p. 100).  The 
difficulty in knowing and interpreting a person’s life 
experiences with trust and the trust culture is shown in the 
case study analysis.  It is unclear how either played a role 
in the success of a deception—but it is still something that 
warrants consideration. 
Undermining trust has much potential in deception 
operations.  The deception of the FARC was successful due to 
a man-in-the-middle attack that was partly made possible by 
the FARC’s distrust of normal communication channels and use 
of couriers or “human envoys.” Their distrust led to them 
using less secure communication channels, making them 
vulnerable.  Often, an individual or state may use a 
communication channel despite the fact that it is 
susceptible to being compromised.  During World War II, 
agents were still used despite the fact that many were 
turned.  Computer systems that are vulnerable to attack and 
monitoring by an adversary are used despite the potential 
threats.   
Undermining trust in organizations can also be very 
effective.  The FBI COINTELPRO destroyed trust in the Ku 
Klux Klan by undermining expectations and grounds for trust. 
Making members question the reputation or performance of 
leaders and highlighting or inventing breaches of trust 
amongst members or leaders are two ways that this was 
accomplished.  While these particular methods may not be 
effective on terrorist or extremist organizations, trust is 
common to all organizations and provides opportunity for 
manipulation. 
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Throughout history and in recent conflicts, deception 
has been used successfully to achieve objectives at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. The study 
and practice of deception has great value to U.S. forces and 
should continue to be exercised.  A common element in 
various deception theories is the need to know the enemy in 
order to confirm his expectations and beliefs with a 
credible deception story. Additionally, there are common 
human psychological traits that can aid in analysis. It is 
important prior to planning and executing deception 
operations to not only understand what the adversary is 
thinking, but to also understand the impact that the 
deception will have on the adversarial mind. Looking at 
deception, as well as the desired end objectives, with trust 
in mind can be helpful. 
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